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Abstract
This thesis explores issues related to public and private insurance of income shocks, and the
importance of human capital accumulation.
The first chapter argues that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor supply
(i.e.s.) is a state-dependent variable which strongly depends on the return to human capital
accumulation. Estimating a life cycle model I find that the average i.e.s. is low (0.35),
and comparable with micro estimates, even in the presence of human capital. However, the
average i.e.s. hide important heterogeneity: for college graduates the i.e.s. more than doubles
over the life cycle, whereas it increases by about 58 percent for workers without a college degree.
The second chapter argues that heterogeneous returns to human capital accumulation
affects the degree to which search effort of unemployed deviates from the socially optimal
level, and the reason behind the deviation. I find that (i) the main social costs associated with
unemployment insurance are not due to moral hazard problems, but are due to distortionary
effects of labor income taxes needed to finance the insurance. (ii) The magnitude of the moral
hazard problem and the tax distortion problem, differs substantially by age and education.
And, (iii) the degree of tax progressiveness and benefit regressiveness has important effects on
the deviation of search effort.
The third chapter study the relation between co-movement of income shocks and precau-
tionary asset holdings. If households perceive spousal labor supply as an insurance mechanism,
it is evident that this mechanism should work better the lower the co-movement of income
shocks. We find that (i) households in which both spouses have the same education level or
work in the same industry have a higher correlation of income shocks compared to couples
with different education/industry. And, (ii) households who face larger co-movements of
income shocks hold larger precautionary buffers.
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Introduction
This thesis explores issues related to the role of public and private insurance of income shocks,
and the importance of human capital accumulation.
The first chapter focuses mainly on the role of human capital accumulation in explaining
labor supply decisions. In this chapter I offer new insights on the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of labor supply (i.e.s.) both at a theoretical and an empirical level. I first show
that within a standard life cycle model of labor supply featuring human capital accumulation,
the i.e.s. is a state-dependent variable which strongly depends on the return to human capital
accumulation. I identify two important sources of heterogeneity w.r.t. return to human
capital accumulation: age and education. Second, I argue that the average i.e.s. is low and
comparable with micro estimates, even in the presence of human capital. Estimating the life
cycle model for two different education groups; workers with and without a college degree, I
find that the average i.e.s. in the sample is 0.35. However, the average i.e.s. hide important
heterogeneity: for college graduates the i.e.s. more than doubles over the life cycle, whereas it
increases by about 58 percent for workers without a college degree. Moreover, young workers
without a college degree have 32 percent higher i.e.s. than young college graduates. Finally, I
find that the welfare costs of permanent tax changes are much lower than previously found in
models with human capital.
The second chapter focuses on the effects of public insurance of unemployment uncer-
tainty, taking into account that workers have different returns to labor market experience. In
particular, I argue that it is important to take into account heterogeneous returns to labor
market experience when analyzing both the degree to which search effort of unemployed
deviates from the socially optimal level, and the reason behind the deviation. Whereas the
moral hazard problem traditionally has been viewed as the main cost associated with UI,
the presence of a career-effect substantially increases the social costs associated with tax
distortions, which are created by the need to finance the UI. Using a life cycle model featuring
heterogeneous returns to labor market experience and costly search effort of unemployed,
I measure the degree to which search effort deviates from the socially (constrained) opti-
mal level, and the relative importance of the moral hazard problem and the tax distortion
problem. The three main findings are: (i) the main social costs associated with today’s
US unemployment insurance are not due to moral hazard problems, but are due to the
distortionary effects of labor income taxes needed to finance the insurance. (ii) The magnitude
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of the moral hazard problem and the tax distortion problem, differs substantially over the
life cycle and across education groups. And, (iii) the degree of tax progressiveness and ben-
efit regressiveness has important effects on the deviation of search effort from the optimal level.
In the third chapter, we focus on the role of spousal labor supply as a source of insurance
against labor income uncertainty. The chapter takes takes a first step towards a better
understanding of the nature of income risk that different households face by studying the
relation between co-movement of income shocks and precautionary asset holdings. If households
perceive spousal labor supply as an insurance mechanism, it is evident that this mechanism
should work better the lower the co-movement in shocks to the spousal incomes. Thus, if the
household is using labor supply to smooth shocks we should see that the correlation of shocks
to the spouses’ wages matters for precautionary wealth accumulation, independent of the
variance of the joint wage processes. We test this prediction empirically using administrative
data from Norway. First, we document that households in which both spouses have the same
education level or are working in the same industry have a higher correlation of income shocks
than couples that have different education levels and work in different industries. Second, we
show that households who face larger co-movements of income shocks hold larger precautionary
buffers. More specifically, we find that an increase from the lowest to the highest correlation
documented in our sample would predict a median increase in financial assets of 97,144 NOK,
or equivalently 16 percent of yearly disposable income.
1 Human Capital and the State-Dependent
Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution
1.1 Introduction
Over the last decades substantial effort has been devoted to estimating the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution for labor supply (i.e.s.). The i.e.s. plays a crucial role in both
the public finance literature and in the real business cycle literature, as it describes how
individuals shift labor supply across periods in response to tax changes and wage changes.
Moreover, it governs the life cycle labor supply decision. The i.e.s. describes both how labor
supply changes along the expected wage profile, and how labor supply responds to unexpected
shifts in the wage profile.
In this paper I show, both theoretically and empirically, that the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution of labor with respect to transitory wage changes is not constant across the
population nor is it constant throughout an individual’s working-life. In particular, the
i.e.s. is a state-dependent variable that depends crucially on worker’s return to labor market
experience, henceforth referred to as human capital. When workers accumulate human
capital through labor supply, return to labor is the sum of contemporaneous wages and
the discounted future gains in wages. The larger is the (discounted) future gains in wages
relative to contemporaneous wages, the smaller is the response of labor supply to changes in
contemporaneous wages. Thus, workers with a high return to human capital accumulation
will have a lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution compared to workers with a low
return to human capital accumulation.
I identify two important sources of heterogeneity with respect to the return to human
capital accumulation; age and education. Age, and in particular years left until retirement, is
important as it determines how long workers will benefit from an increase in human capital.
Moreover, it is plausible that production of human capital becomes more difficult with age. As
a result, the i.e.s. will increase with age. Looking at cohort averages of real wage profiles taken
from the Current Population Survey (CPS), from age 23 to age 45, where wages typically starts
to level off, it seems evident that there are large differences in the return to human capital
accumulation across education groups: real wages increases by 27 percent for individuals with
less than High School, 42 percent for High School graduate, 70 percent for workers with some
This chapter has benefitted from comments from seminar participants at the 2012 EEA conference, the
7th Nordic Summer Symposium in Macroeconomics, the University of Oslo and Norges Bank.
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College education, and finally 137 percent for College graduates.1 As the i.e.s. is decreasing
in the return to human capital accumulation, it will decrease with education.
A second contribution of the paper is to draw attention on the sample used to estimate
the i.e.s.. There is an important distinction to be made between voluntary and involuntary
quits. This is because involuntary quits are not a choice by the worker, and should therefore
not be included in the measure of labor supply when estimating the i.e.s.. I show that the
majority of unemployment spells are involuntary; The share of voluntary transitions from
employment to unemployment are less than 20 percent for young college graduates and about
15 percent for young workers without a college degree, according to monthly data on labor
market transitions taken from the CPS data set. From age 30 and onwards, the shares of
voluntary quits are even lower. Moreover, one must be cautious with respect to changes
in labor supply due to sample selection, in particular changes in the share of students. I
show that most of the sharp increase in the extensive margin, measured as no. of weeks
worked during a year, between age 20 and age 25 is due to a significant reduction in weeks of
unemployment, and an increase in the no. of weeks worked due to students leaving university
and starting to work throughout the year. Whether or not these changes are included in the
measure of labor supply matter significantly for the estimate of the i.e.s.. This is because the
main changes in labor supply comes from the extensive margin and occurs early in life, when
the increase in wages is strongest. Ideally, one should then control for all workers who are
involuntary unemployed and all workers who switch from being a student to working during a
survey year. However, when this is not possible, I argue that it is better to only include the
intensive margin as a measure of optimal labor supply. This implies that the i.e.s. estimates
refers to the intertemporal elasticity of the intensive-margin only.2
To quantify the importance of the state-dependency of the i.e.s. and the empirical measure
of labor supply, I estimate a life cycle model with endogenous labor supply along the intensive
margin, human capital accumulation through learning by doing and wage uncertainty, using
cohort data on white males from CPS for workers with and without a college degree. As
emphasized by Blundell and Macurdy (1999), the primary method of estimating the i.e.s.
in the presence of human capital is to use a structural model. The individuals return to
human capital accumulation is not observable, and as shown below, when wages depend on
the endogenous stock of human capital, the i.e.s. is no longer a constant but a function of
several variables and parameters.
First, I find that the i.e.s. is low, with a population average of 0.35, and comparable
with micro estimates, even in the presence of human capital accumulation. A vast micro
literature has estimated the i.e.s. assuming that wages are exogenous to the hours decision,
and typically find an estimate of the i.e.s. in the range (0− 0.5). (See e.g. MaCurdy (1981),
1The importance of education depends on one reasonable assumption, namely that differences in real wages
reflects differences in the value of human capital, either due to a difference in the stock of human capital or
differences in the rental rate on human capital. Then, differences in the growth of real wages reflects differences
in the return to human capital accumulation.
2See e.g. Chetty et al. (2011) for a discussion of the difference between estimates of the i.e.s. for the
intensive and extensive margin.
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Browning et al. (1985); Altonji (1986); Abowd and Card (1987); Ham and Reilly (2002);
French (2005)).3 However, as first noted by Heckman (1976), the assumption of exogenous
wages may bias the estimate of the i.e.s. downwards. Imai and Keane (2004) and Wallenius
(2011) estimate life cycle models with human capital using micro data, and find estimates of
the i.e.s. of 3.8 and 0.8-1.3, respectively.4 The parameters reported by Imai and Keane (2004)
and Wallenius (2011) refer to the i.e.s. with respect to changes in the total return to labor,
and not only wages which is the focus here.5,6 As a comparison, I find an estimate of the
i.e.s. for the total return to labor (or soon-to-retire-workers) of 0.45. Both Imai and Keane
and Wallenius target annual labor supply, which implicitly assumes that all non-employment
spells are voluntary.7 The use of labor supply measure is thus important: using a similar
methodology but targeting only the intensive margin of labor supply, I find an estimate of the
i.e.s. for soon-to-retire-workers which is about half of what Wallenius obtains and 1/12th of
what Imai and Keane finds. This estimate is however likely to be biased downwards, as some
of the changes in the extensive margin are voluntary and related to wage changes. But, given
the large share of involuntary unemployment it seems reasonable to assume that the upward
bias on the i.e.s. of targeting annual hours is considerably larger than the downward bias of
only targeting the intensive margin. Moreover, it serves as an important benchmark for the
i.e.s. of the intensive margin in models with human capital accumulation.
Second, I find that there is a large heterogeneity across workers with respect to the
return on human capital, and thus a large heterogeneity w.r.t. the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. Whereas workers soon-to-retire has an i.e.s. of 0.45, the estimate of the
i.e.s. for workers aged 25 is only 0.22 and 0.29 for workers with and without a college degree,
respectively. Thus, the estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor for
college graduates aged 25 is less than half of the estimate for workers soon-to-retire. And,
young workers without a college degree have 32 percent higher i.e.s. than young college
educated. Using population weights calculated from the CPS, and a share of 1/3 college
graduates, the average i.e.s. in the population is 0.35. Thus, the average elasticity is well
below the estimate of the i.e.s. for workers soon-to-retire, which is identical to the estimate
of the (inverse) curvature of the marginal disutility of labor. An estimate of the average i.e.s.
of 0.35 is within the range of what is obtained in the micro literature, using a comparable
3See Pencavel (1986) for an early survey of this literature.
4See Keane (2011) for a survey of the effects of taxes on labor supply in both static models and dynamic
models with human capital accumulation.
5Alternatively, it is the i.e.s. for the workers with zero return to human capital accumulation, which in
their models is the workers soon-to-retire.
6When the i.e.s. is state-dependent, there is no longer a direct mapping from the utility parameter to the
i.e.s. This is important to take into account when comparing estimates of the i.e.s. across different models.
See also Keane and Rogerson (2012) for a discussion of the link between the utility parameter and the i.e.s..
7In order to minimize the effect of students, Imai and Keane (2004) use only observations for workers the
year after they last reported to be students. However, as the student status is the current status whereas the
labor supply is asked in retrospect "hours worked last calender year", Imai and Keane still include a large share
of students in their sample and will have an increase in their labor supply measure as students graduate and
start working.
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sample with respect to age and education composition.
The structural estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution by different educa-
tion groups are novel. However, previous studies has argued that the response of labor supply
to temporary wage fluctuations would differ across age, see Shaw (1989), Imai and Keane
(2004) and Keane (2012). Shaw estimates a life cycle model with human capital and argues
that the elasticity is increasing with age. However, due to the choice of utility function she
cannot recover the i.e.s.. Imai and Keane compute the uncompensated response of hours to a
temporary shock to wages, and find that it increases sharply with age: at age 20 workers are
found to have an implicit elasticity of 0.3, whereas at age 60 they find an implicit elasticity
which is more than 5 times larger (1.7). However, as shown by Wallenius (2011) the model
by Imai and Keane has poor out of sample fit for older workers. As explained below, this
gives a substantial overestimation of the response by older workers. Moreover, neither of these
studies consider educational differences.
The state-dependency of the i.e.s. indicates that one should be cautious when comparing
estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution obtained from different samples
with respect to e.g. the age and education distribution. Moreover, it provides a theoretical
explanation for why studies find that the labor supply elasticity increases with the wealth
distribution (see e.g. Ziliak and Kniesner (1999)) and increases with age and decreases with
education (see e.g. Blau and Kahn (2007)). Analyzing the life cycle labor supply effects of
taxes, Ziliak and Kniesner find that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution increases by
about 39 percent from the lowest wealth quartile to the top quartile.8 This is consistent
with the findings in this paper, as wealth and the i.e.s. both increase over the life cycle.
Looking at the wealth quartiles of the simulated data from the model, which is however
not matched to real data, I find that the i.e.s. increases by 32 percent from the lowest to
the top quartile. Blau and Kahn estimate labor supply elasticities for married women, and
analyze the elasticity separately for different age groups and different education groups. They
find that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution increases sharply with age, and falls
with education, which is consistent with a model of human capital accumulation of the sort
presented in this paper.9
Keane (2012) finds that welfare costs associated with permanent tax changes are large,
once the effects of human capital are properly taken into account. Whereas human capital
dampens the effect of transitory tax changes for young workers, because it does not affect the
return to human capital, Keane shows that human capital amplifies the effect of permanent
tax changes through a "snowball-effect". A decline in current labor supply reduces (expected)
future wages through a lower production of human capital. Lower future wages reduces future
8Note that increase in the i.e.s. over wealth quartiles most likely is too large. I find that the negative bias
of excluding human capital is largest for young workers, which typically also are wealth-poor workers. Thus, as
the estimation bias shrinks with age, it most likely also shrinks with wealth quartiles. Thus, the increase in
estimates of the i.e.s. over wealth quartiles is overstated.
9Note that the estimates of Blau and Kahn (2007) are however likely to be biased to zero, as they do not
take into account that wages are not exogenous to the labor supply decision. And, in light of the findings in
this paper, the estimation bias for younger workers and higher educated workers are larger.
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labor supply, and thus further lowers future wages. Combined with a high intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, Keane finds that this snowball-effect is large, and the welfare costs
of permanent tax changes are large, and more than 4 to 7 times larger than what is found
in conventional models excluding the effects of human capital. Performing a similar exercise
as Keane, but using the model estimated below, I find that human capital do amplify the
effect of permanent tax changes, but the amplification effect is small. In response to a 5
percentage point permanent tax increase, welfare, measured in consumption loss, is reduced
by 1.99 percent and 2.12 percent for non-college workers and college workers, respectively. In
a model without human capital, the corresponding consumption loss is 1.5 percent for both
education groups. The amplification effect of human capital is much smaller due to both a
much lower intertemporal elasticity of substitution, but also due to a better model fit. As
shown by Wallenius (2011), the out-of-sample fit of the model by Imai and Keane, which is
above age 36, is poor. Hours and wages fall to sharply towards zero. With decreasing returns
to scale, the level of hours matters for the snowball effect: the lower is the labor supply,
the larger is the production of human capital per unit of labor supply, and the larger is the
corresponding reduction in the production of human capital due to a tax change.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the life cycle model.
Section 3 describes the data used in the estimation, and section 4 explains the estimation
strategy and present the results. In section 5, the estimation bias of the i.e.s. in discussed in
more detail, and section 6 provides some robustness checks. Section 7 examines the welfare
costs of tax changes in the model estimated in section 4, and finally, section 7 concludes.
1.2 Model
The model is a discrete-time life cycle model for a finitely lived agent facing human capital
uncertainty. I use the deterministic model of Wallenius (2011), and add wage/human capital
uncertainty in the same way as Imai and Keane (2004). The agent is endowed with one unit
of time at each date, and retirement is exogenously imposed at a given age. For simplicity, I
omit age subscripts on the variables since there is a one to one relationship between time, t,
and age, a. The agents are subject to an idiosyncratic shock to the stock of human capital at
the beginning of each period, and must have non-negative assets at death.
The agent has separable preferences over consumption, c, and hours worked, n, given by
Et
T∑
t=0
βt [U(ct)− v(nt)] , (1.1)
where β is the discount factor and Et is the expectation operator, where the expectation is
taken with respect to future human capital shocks. U is a concave function, v is a convex
function, and they are both continuous and twice differentiable. A working age agent faces an
intertemporal budget constraint
ct + kt+1 ≤ (1 + r)kt + wtnt,
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where kt is the asset holdings at time t, r is the interest rate on assets, and wt is the hourly
wage at time t.10 The observed wage per hour at age t is defined as the product of the
stochastic human capital stock εtht and the rental rate on human capital pht :
wt = pht εtht, (1.2)
where the shock to the human capital stock, εt, is assumed to be a mean one, i.i.d. stochastic
process with a log-normal distribution,
ln(εt) ∼ N
(
−12σ
2, σ2
)
.
The shock to the human capital stock may be thought of as a shock to the depreciation rate of
human capital. Note that although the shock is i.i.d., the effect on future wages is persistent
through the human capital channel: a high shock today increases labor supply and human
capital accumulation, and thus increases future wages.
The choice of introducing uncertainty into the model may have important effects on the
estimate of the i.e.s.. If workers are risk averse, the human capital shock will decrease the
expected utility weighted return of human capital, as low realizations of the shock gets a
higher weight than high realizations. This will decrease the return to labor. However, if asset
markets are incomplete, labor supply may act as an insurance devise against idiosyncratic
risk which increases the return to labor. First, in order to smooth consumption, workers may
increase labor supply in response to a low human capital shock today.11 Second, as workers
accumulate human capital while working, labor supply also acts as an insurance devise against
low shocks to human capital in the future. As young workers are typically also poor workers
who need insurance the most in order to smooth consumption, they have a stronger incentive
to increase labor supply today in response to a bad shock and to insure against future wage
shocks. This increases the expected utility weighted return of human capital. Moreover,
if asset markets are incomplete, uncertainty about future wages will lead to precautionary
savings for poor workers.12 Thus, the return to labor will increase for these workers, as their
marginal utility of consumption increases. As young workers are typically poor workers, they
have a stronger precautionary savings effect. Thus, the effect due to incomplete markets
increases the return to labor, and more so for young workers. The total effect is unclear:
whether or not uncertainty makes the life cycle profile for the total return to labor, and thus
optimal labor supply profile, steeper or flatter is determined by the parameters. A steeper
(flatter) profile for the optimal labor supply results in a lower (higher) estimate of the i.e.s.,
compared to the model without uncertainty.
Following Imai and Keane (2004) and Wallenius (2011) I assume that the rental rate on
human capital is constant for all ages and normalizes it to one for all time periods. This
implies that the wage rate equals the current stock of human capital, wt = εtht.
10The price of consumption is normalized to 1.
11Pijoan-Mas (2006) finds that households use work effort extensively as a mechanism to smooth consumption
when facing uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity risk.
12See e.g. Low (2005) for a discussion of how precationary motives affects labor supply over the life cycle.
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I assume that human capital accumulation is limited to learning-by-doing, or equivalently,
is a by-product of market work. The more time a worker spends in the market, the higher is
the accumulation of human capital. Human capital evolves according to
ht+1 = (1− δ)εtht +G(nt, εtht, at), 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, (1.3)
where δ is the rate of depreciation and G(nt, εtht, at) is the production function of human
capital, which is concave, twice differentiable and increasing in nt and εtht. Age is included in
the function to allow for different human capital production at different ages.
Workers maximize life time utility with respect to consumption, labor supply, asset holdings
and human capital accumulation. The value function is given by
Vt(kt, ht, εt) = max
ct,kt+1,nt,ht+1
{u(ct)− v(nt) + βEtVt+1(kt+1, ht+1, εt+1)} ,
and maximized subject to
ct ≤
{
(1 + r)kt − kt+1 + εthtnt, t < Tˆ
(1 + r)kt − kt+1 + P¯ , if t ≥ Tˆ
, (1.4)
ht+1 = (1− δ)εtht +G(nt, εtht, at), t < Tˆ (1.5)
kT+1 = 0, (1.6)
0 ≤ nt ≤ 1, ∀t < Tˆ , nt = 0 ∀t ≥ Tˆ (1.7)
ct ≥ 0, k0, h0 given (1.8)
where P¯ is the pension benefit, and Tˆ is the exogenously imposed retirement age.
Let λt denote the Lagrange multiplier on the age t budget constraint, and µt the multiplier
on the age t human capital accumulation constraint. The first order conditions are
ct : u′(ct) = λt, ∀t (1.9)
kt+1 : λt = βEt
∂Vt+1(kt+1, ht+1, εt+1)
∂kt+1
, t < Tˆ (1.10)
nt : v′(nt) = λtεtht + µt
∂G(nt, εtht,at)
∂nt
, t < Tˆ , εt = 1 (1.11)
ht+1 : µt = βEt
∂Vt+1(kt+1, ht+1, εt+1)
∂ht+1
, t < Tˆ (1.12)
Using the envelope conditions to substitute for the derivatives of the value function yields the
following equations
u′(ct) = β(1 + r)Etu′(ct+1), (1.13)
v′(nt) = u′(ct)εtht + µt
∂G(nt, εtht,at)
∂nt
, (1.14)
µt = βEt
((
(1− δ)εt+1 + ∂G(nt+1, εt+1ht+1,at+1)
∂ht+1
)
µt+1 + εt+1u′(ct+1)nt+1
)
.(1.15)
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Equation (1.13) is the familiar consumption Euler equation. Equation (1.14) equates the
marginal disutility of labor to its marginal benefit. The first term on the r.h.s. is the effect
on current utility from higher labor income. The second term is the learning effect; working
an additional hour increases human capital and hence future wages. Multiplying the learning
effect with the shadow price on skill, µ, gives the marginal utility of increased human capital.
Equation (1.15) is the law of motion for the shadow price of skill.
Equation (1.14) demonstrate why the i.e.s. is no longer a constant, but a state-dependent
variable: Due to human capital accumulation, the return to labor is a function of both the
contemporaneous wage and discounted future gains in wages. As transitory wage shocks only
affects the contemporaneous term, workers with a high future gains in wages (in relative
terms) will respond less to transitory shocks compared to workers with low gains in future
wages.13
Let’s define the i.e.s. as the percentage change in hours over time in response to an
exogenous unanticipated temporary change in the rental rate on human capital. And, assume
that the disutility of labor and the production function of human capital takes the following
functional forms
v(nt) = b
n
1
γ
+1
t
1
γ + 1
, b ≥ 0, γ > 0,
G(nt, εtht, at) = A exp(−dat)εthtnαt , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, A, d ≥ 0.
Then, the i.e.s. is defined as14
d
(
nt
nt+1
)
dpht
pht
nt
nt+1
= γ 1(
bn
1
γ
−1
t − γµt ∂2Gt∂n2t
) (u′(ct)εtht + ∂Gt
∂nt
∂µt
∂pht
)
pht
nt
(
1− ∂nt+1
∂ht+1
∂Gt
∂nt
nt
nt+1
)
.
(1.16)
Without human capital accumulation ∂Gt∂nt is zero, and the i.e.s. is equal to γ. With human
capital the i.e.s. possibly depends on all state variables; human capital, asset position, the
shock to the human capital stock and age, and all parameters of the model.
Let’s analyze how the i.e.s. will evolve over the life cycle. For all parameter values
considered below, the product ∂Gt∂nt
∂µt
∂pht
is very close to zero, and so is ∂nt+1∂ht+1
∂Gt
∂nt
nt
nt+1
. This
implies that the importance of the state-dependency of the i.e.s. does not come from that
fact that it alters also future labor supply decisions through the human capital effect. Instead,
the importance of human capital in making the i.e.s. state-dependent is to change the "pass-
through" of wage changes. As wages is only a faction of the return to labor, and this fraction
changes with age, so does the labor supply elasticity. In order to simplify the expression, I
therefore impose that ∂Gt∂nt
∂µt
∂pht
= ∂nt+1∂ht+1
∂Gt
∂nt
nt
nt+1
= 0, such that the expression becomes
13See also Keane (2012) and Keane and Rogerson (2012) for a similar discussion of the effects of human
capital.
14For a more detalied calculation of the i.e.s., see the appendix.
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d
(
nt
nt+1
)
dpht
pht
nt
nt+1
= γ 1(
1 + 1
u′(ct)pht εtht
µt
∂Gt
∂nt
(1− γ(α− 1))
) . (1.17)
As shown below, the shadow price on skills, µt, is decreasing over the life cycle as the working
life horizon shrinks, contributing to an increase in the intertemporal substitutability of labor
over the life cycle. The same is true for the slope of the production function of human capital,
∂Gt
∂nt
, both due to decreasing returns to scale in the production of human capital and because
learning becomes more difficult with age (d > 0). Moreover, due to consumption smoothing,
the increase in wages is larger than the increase in consumption over the life cycle, so that
1
u′(ct)εthtpht
is decreasing over the life cycle. Again, this contribute to an increasing i.e.s. over
the life cycle. Hence, the i.e.s. will be increasing over the life cycle, as contemporaneous
wages becomes relatively more important for the workers, and will approach γ, which is the
i.e.s. of the workers in the last period before retirement (when µTˆ = 0).
The larger is the fall in the shadow price on skills over the life cycle, the larger is the
increase in the i.e.s. over the life cycle, and the further apart is the average intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of labor from the value of γ. As more education is associated with a
higher return to human capital for young workers, and thus larger fall in the shadow price
on skills over the life cycle, the i.e.s. should increase more for higher educated workers. The
state-dependency of the i.e.s. i further explored below, in section 4.
Note that the response of labor supply to a human capital shock, εt, would be different
than the response to changes in the rental rate, as εt changes the whole future path of expected
wages and then also the expected return on current human capital accumulation.
1.3 Data
The choice of using data from the CPS is motivated by the findings in Wallenius (2011); she
shows that the life cycle profile implied by the estimates found in Imai and Keane (2004),
using a life cycle profile based on individuals aged 20-36 years, have poor out of sample fit
and stress the importance of using long life cycle profiles, which is possible using the CPS.
I use monthly CPS data from 1979 to 2008, and construct an average life cycle profile for
wages and labor supply for individuals aged 25 to 60 years, using 17 consecutive cohorts.15 As
shown below, there are large differences in hours and wages across education levels. The main
educational difference is between those with and those without a college degree. I therefore
choose to split my sample in workers with a college degree and workers without a college
degree. To make my results comparable with most of the literature, I limit my sample to
white males.16 I use only data on individuals which are in the labor force and have well
defined hours and wage data.17
15The data are from CEPR, Center for Economic and Policy Research. 2006. CPS ORG Uniform Extracts,
Version 1.5 . Washington, DC
16I also exclude individuals that are students, have served in the military and self employed workers.
17I include only individuals with usual weekly hours above 4 hours and below 99 hours.
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Unlike both Imai and Keane (2004) and Wallenius (2011), I start my sample at age 25
instead of at age 20, and I use monthly data on "usual weekly hours" instead of annual data
on "usual weekly hours" multiplied by "weeks worked". This is motivated from the desire to
find the best measure of labor supply, when estimating the i.e.s.. The life cycle profile for
"usual weekly hours", labeled "intensive", and "usual weekly hours x weeks worked", labeled
"total", are plotted in figure 1.1 for workers with and without a college degree.18 Given that
wages exhibits its largest increase in the period between age 20 and age 30, the choice of
labor supply measure matters for the estimate of the i.e.s.: the larger is the increase in the
optimal labor supply, the stronger is the relation between wages and hours, and the higher is
the estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The natural question to ask is
then: what is behind this sharp increase in the extensive margin, i.e. "weeks worked", plotted
in figure 1.2.
Figure 1.1: Life cycle patterns for different measures of hours, age averages.
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Note: March CPS data from 1979 to 2008. Age averages of 14 consecutive cohorts. The profiles are
normalized to 1 at age 20 for workers with no college degree, and at age 22 for workers with a College
degree. The two measures are calculated as follows: Total= "usual weekly hours"* "weeks worked last
year", and Intensive="usual weekly hours",
The large increase in the no. of weeks worked is due to a decline in the average number of
weeks workers are unemployed, see figure 1.3(a), and a sharp increase in the participation
rate, i.e. a sharp decline in the no of weeks out of the labor force, see figure 1.3(b).
Let’s first analyze the nature of unemployment. Using monthly CPS data on labor market
transitions from 2001 to 2007, which span one business cycle defined by the NBER, I compute
the share of voluntary and involuntary employment to unemployment transitions and the
18Data from: Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Sarah Flood, Katie Genadek, Matthew B.
Schroeder, Brandon Trampe, and Rebecca Vick. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population
Survey: Version 3.0., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.
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Figure 1.2: Weeks worked, age averages.
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Note: March CPS data from 1979 to 2008. Age averages of 14 consecutive cohorts.
Figure 1.3: Weeks unemployed, weeks not in the labor force, and the share of students. Age
averages.
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Note: March CPS data from 1979 to 2008. Age averages of 14 consecutive cohorts.
job finding probability of workers with and without a college degree.19,20,21 The fraction of
voluntary unemployed are slightly higher for the workers with a college degree, but the fraction
are small for all ages, see figure 1.4.22 Given that I cannot distinguish between voluntary and
involuntary unemployment in data used in the estimation below, I argue that changes in the
extensive margin due to unemployment should not be included in the measure of optimal
19Voluntary unemployed is defined as those who report that they are unemployed because they "quit job".
The involuntary are those who are unemployed due to "temporary job ended", "lost job" or "on layoff".
20The data are collected from the NBER. I match individual transitions based on household identifiers, age,
sex, race, individual line number and months in sample. Due to limitations on available data I cannot calculate
these measures for the whole time period from 1979 and onwards.
21I use data that spans one business cycle due to Shimer (2007) findings that there are substantial fluctuations
in the job finding probability at business cycle frequencies.
22I also find that there is no significant difference between the job finding probability of the two groups.
Results are available on request.
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labor supply.
Figure 1.4: Job separation probability, share of voluntary quits. Age averages.
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Note: Monthly CPS data from 2001 to 2007.
Second, the sharp decrease in weeks out of the labor force goes hand in hand with a sharp
decrease in the share of students in the sample, see 1.3 (b). This indicates that a part of the
increase in the extensive margin is due to sample selection issues: students aged 20-25 work
on average 21 weeks opposed to the average of non-students of 43 weeks, thus as the share of
students decline the average weeks worked in the sample increases significantly. The choice of
years of education, and thus the choice of low labor supply during studies, is linked to the
expected wage increase over the life cycle, not just the expected wage in the years shortly after
leaving university. Thus, the choice to increase labor supply the year after leaving university
is not directly linked to the wage increase experienced in the same period, and should not be
used in the estimation of the i.e.s. Due to the nature of the annual data I cannot remove
students from the sample.23 In order to minimize the sample selection issue due to students
entering the labor force, I therefore start the sample at age 25, when most individuals have
finished their studies.
Excluding the weeks workers are unemployed from the measure of labor supply, due to
the finding that most unemployment is involuntary, reduces the measure of labor supply
towards the measure of the intensive margin, see figure 1.5.24 For non-college-graduates the
two measures are almost identical, and for college graduates the measure of total labor supply
excluding unemployment lies inbetween the two other measures. However, once starting
at age 25, the three measures of labor supply are very similar. Looking at the increase
in wage dispersion over time, Lemieux (2006) finds that "... The main problem with the
March CPS is that it poorly measures the wages of workers paid by the hour (the majority
of the work force)", and suggests using monthly data on ORG CPS instead. To be robust
23In the CPS (and in the NLSY), the student status refers to the time of the interview, whereas data on
labor supply refer to the year preceding the interview. Thus, I cannot detect students that left university
during the last year, and possibly had low labor supply during that year.
24The measure of total labor supply, exclusive changes in unemployment is calculated as follows
Total, exUnemp = "weeks worked"∗"usual weekly hours"(52−"weeks unemployed")∗14∗7
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towards measurement errors in the wage data I therefore use monthly data, and thus restrict
the labor supply measure to only include the intensive margin. Thus, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution estimated refers only to the intensive margin. However, given that
most unemployment spells are involuntary and given that the measure of total labor supply
excluding unemployment is so similar to the intensive margin, I do believe that i.e.s. of the
total labor supply is similar to the elasticity obtained here.
Figure 1.5: Life cycle patterns for different measures of hours, age averages.
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Note: March CPS data from 1979 to 2008. Age averages of 14 consecutive cohorts. The profiles are
normalized to 1 at age 25. The three measures are calculated as follows: Total= "usual weekly hours"* "weeks
worked last year", Intensive="usual weekly hours", and ’Total, ex Unemp’ =(("usual weeks worked"*"usual
weekly hours")/((52-"weeks unemployed")*14*7))
In the model, the period time endowment is assumed to be equal to one. As is standard
in the literature, I assume that the maximum time allotted to work is 14 hours a day 7 days a
week. The fraction of hours worked by an employed individual in a given period is hence
hours =
′usual weekly hours′
14 ∗ 7 .
The hourly wage is computed as
wage =
′usual weekly earnings′
′usual weekly hours′
,
and is deflated by the CPI to make it comparable across time.
The life cycle profiles for hours and wages are constructed from an average cohort.
Unfortunately, the monthly data starts in 1979, and I thus do not have enough years to cover
a full life cycle, from 25 to 62 years, for one cohort. I therefore take the average of several
cohorts. In order to have a minimum of 5 observations at each age, I use 17 consecutive
cohorts starting with those who were 21 years old in 1979, and continuing with the those who
were 24 in 1979, and so forth up to those who were 37 in 1979. I take the average growth
rate by age of the three variables, and combine these with the initial condition given by the
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average outcome of individuals aged 25 years. The profile obtained for hours and wages are
very robust to changes in number of cohorts once I end my sample at age 60. I therefore limit
my sample to individuals aged 25 to 60 years old.
In addition to the age effect, there is a significant time effect in the data.25 Given that I
merge different cohorts, and that the focus of this paper is on the age effect (life cycle effect),
I want to remove the time effect from the data. I adjust the growth rates of all variables for
all cohorts for the education specific average growth in the sample
∆x˜a,i,t = ∆xa,i,t −∆x¯i,t, ∀ t = 1980 : 2008, a = 21 : 62, i = 1, 2,
where ∆xa,i,t is the change in e.g. the average wage for individuals with age a, education level
i, at time t, and ∆x¯i,t is the change in the age average of wages for individuals with education
level i at time t.26 Assuming that the rental rate on human capital evolves according to the
education specific average growth rate of wages, the growth adjustment of wages can be seen
as removing the changes in the rental rate on human capital over time, and hence making the
data more comparable with the model.
Due to a limited sample size and possibly sampling errors, the life cycle profiles are jagged.
Since I do not want the estimates to be influenced by these issues, I choose to smooth the
data.27 The life cycle profiles of wages and hours for smoothed and unsmoothed data and the
variance of wages of unsmoothed data are plotted in figure 1.6. Both wages and hours are
hump-shaped over the life cycle for both education groups.
The variance of wages are similar for both education groups at age 25, but the variance
increases much less over the life cycle for non-college graduates. This is consistent with the
modeling choice of a complementarity between labor and human capital in the production of
human capital, which increases the variance of human capital in the level of human capital.
1.4 Estimation
The model is estimated using simulated method of moments, where I minimize the sum
of squared percentage deviation of averages of hours and wages by age for both education
groups.28,29 The model period is set to one year.
In order to solve the model, I must specify functional forms, initial level of human capital
and assets and the exogenous age of retirement and death. All individuals enter the labor
25There is potentially cohort effects present in the data, as I merge several cohort. However, analysing life
cycle profiles of inequality in wages and hours Heathcote et al. (2005) find no evidence that cohort effects are
important. I therefore abstract from cohort effects.
26I control for changes in age distributions over time, by using the same age-weighting each year.
27In particular I smooth the data using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 75 for real
wages and the unemployment rate and 30 for hours.
28The simulated moments are constructed in the following way: I solve the model for a particular parameter
guess, simulate the life cycle profile for 50000 individuals, and then compute average hours and wage profiles at
a given age. I then compute the age averages of the two variables.
29In the weighting matrix I put double weight on the moments of labor supply, in order to obtain a good
match for both variables.
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Figure 1.6: Wages, hours and the variance of wages. Age averages.
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Note: Monthly CPS data from 1979 to 2008. Age averages of 14 consecutive cohorts. The two lines per
education groups show the raw data and the smoothed data.
force at age 25, retire at age 62, and after 15 years in retirement they exogenously die at age
77.30 I further assume that the initial level of assets is set to zero, k25 = 0, and that the initial
level of human capital is set to match the educational difference between the two education
groups at age 25. In particular, the initial level of human capital is set to one for workers
without a college degree and to 1.13 for workers with a college degree. Both education groups
are assumed to have the same preferences, but differs in the production function of human
capital. I use the following functional forms for preferences and the human capital production
function, G(·)
30The age of death in the model is motivated by the life expectancy at age 20 for white males in the US,
which is 76.8 years (Source: U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Reports
(NVSR), Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2008, Vol. 59, No. 2, December 2010.)
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u(ct) = ln(ct), (1.18)
v(nt) = b
n
1
γ
+1
t
1
γ + 1
, b ≥ 0, γ > 0, (1.19)
Gi(nt, εtht, at) = Ai exp(−diat)εthtnαit , 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, A, d ≥ 0, i ∈ {NDC,CD}.(1.20)
The functions for preferences and the production function for human capital are taken from
Wallenius (2011). Preferences are assumed to be separable and consistent with a balanced
growth path. The choice of utility function may have implications for the estimation result.
In particular, since the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption and labor are
linked, the choice of log utility in consumption may affect the estimate of the inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution of labor. The possibility of a higher risk aversion is explored in
section 5.
The disutility function of labor supply is standard. Note that whereas γ is the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution of labor with respect to temporary wage changes in a model without
human capital, this is no longer true here. Here, γ refers to the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution of labor with respect to the total return to labor supply31, or alternatively, γ
refers to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of labor with respect to wages for those
workers who have no future gain of human capital accumulation, i.e. those workers who will
retire next period.
The production function of human capital is a Cobb-Douglas with labor and human capital
as inputs, where A exp(−dat) is the productivity parameter. The choice of complementarity
between labor and human capital in the production of human capital is due to the finding by
e.g. Imai and Keane (2004) that the marginal effect of an hour on future wages is increasing
significantly with current wages. If d is positive, human capital accumulation will be more
demanding with age.32
The pension benefit is set to 40% of the average income for an average individual over the
life cycle.33 In the model, only the product β(1 + r) matters for the labor supply. Hence, I
cannot identify both, and I therefor set r = 0.04. In order to limit the number of parameters
to estimate, I follow Wallenius (2011) and assume that the annual rate of depreciation, δ, is 3
per cent. This is in line with micro evidence on the wage costs of labor market intermittency
provided by Kim and Polachek (1994), which find that the annual rate of depreciation is
between 2− 5 percent when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues.
In the benchmark estimation I assume that the preference parameters, β, b and γ, are the
same across educations groups. However, in section 5 I show that the results are robust to
assuming education specific preferences. For all estimations considered I assume education
specific parameters for the human capital production function: d, A, and α.34
31Or the opportunity cost of time (OCT), as e.g. Imai and Keane (2004) labels it.
32This is a simpler production function than the one studied by Imai and Keane (2004). However, Wallenius
(2009) shows that the results in Imai and Keane also applies to this production function.
33According to French and Jones (2012), Social security replaces about 40% of pre-retirement earnings.
34In a similar setup Wallenius (2011) cannot identify α. In the estimations below α seems to be well identified.
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In addition I need to specify the distribution of the shock to human capital. First, I follow
Wallenius (2011) and assume that there is no uncertainty. Second, I estimate the model using
the distribution of the human capital shock estimated by Imai and Keane (2004). Using the
variance of wages for the two education groups, which is not a target in the estimation, I
evaluate the performance of the model with uncertainty. Moreover, by comparing the results
obtained below I can assess the effect of uncertainty on the estimate of the i.e.s., and by
comparing my results to the ones obtained by Wallenius and Imai and Keane, I can assess the
difference in results stemming from a different target for labor supply.
1.4.1 Results, no shock
Adjusting the labor supply profile to take into account that most of the changes in the
extensive margin are involuntary or unrelated to the changes in wages gives an estimate of γ
equal to 0.44, which is significantly lower than the estimates obtained by Wallenius (2011)
(0.8− 1.3) using the same model, see table 1.1. By using total annual hours as a measure for
optimal labor supply, Wallenius seems to overestimate the intertemporal substitutability of
labor supply.
Table 1.1: Parameter estimates deterministic model, targeting age 25-60.
NCD CD
γ 0.4358 A 0.1155 0.2588
b 21.2187 d 0.0194 0.0347
β 0.9558 α 0.4821 0.4706
SSE 0.0093
Note: Targets based on monthly CPS data from 1979
to 2008. ’NCD’ refers to workers without a College
degree and ’CD’ refers to workers with a College
degree. SSE is the sum of squared errors.
The model fit for hours and wages for the set of parameters estimated for the two education
groups are plotted in figure 1.7. Apart from predicting to high labor supply among young
college graduates, the model fits the targets well.
As shown above, the i.e.s. is state-dependent. Using equation 1.16, one can calculate the
average i.e.s. by age and education, using the simulated data. Figure 1.8 plots the average
i.e.s. by age and education. Although the i.e.s. for workers close to retirement is equal to the
estimate of γ, the i.e.s. for young college graduates is as low as 0.2, i.e. less than half the
value of γ. For workers without a college degree, the estimate of the i.e.s. for workers aged
By performing the same estimations when fixing α at different values the model fit is varying. Moreover, I
have also tried restricting d to be a common parameter, which gives about the same results as presented below,
however with worse model fit. Apparently, I am able to identify α because I have two education groups with
common preferences. As α is important for the choice of labor supply it is identified both from the curvature
of real wages and curvature of the labor supply. The results of the estimations are presented in appendix B.
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Figure 1.7: Model fit for hours and wages, targeting age 25-60.
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25 is 0.27 and it increases by 62 percent over the life cycle.35 This implies that the average
intertemporal substitutability in the population is much lower than the estimate of γ obtained
above. Using a 1/3 share of college graduates, and the population weights from CPS, the
average i.e.s. in the sample is 0.33, which is 25 percent lower than γ.
Figure 1.8: Intertemporal elasticity of substitution over the life cycle. Age averages of
simulated data.
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The difference in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution comes mainly from large
differences in the return on human capital, see figure 1.9. Non-college graduates have 33
percent higher i.e.s. than college graduates, and 32 percent lower return on human capital
than college graduates at age 25. As one approaches retirement, the gap between the return on
human capital narrows, as does the gap between the intertemporal elasticities of substitution.
35For more details on the calculation, see appendix A.
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Figure 1.9: Returns to human capital, µt ∂Gt∂nt , for non-college graduates and college graduates.
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1.4.2 Results, human capital shock
As shown above, the variance of human capital increases significantly over the life cycle,
supporting the model choice of a stochastic human capital stock. Moreover, introducing
uncertainty may influence the estimate of the i.e.s. due to the insurance role human capital
then plays. As explained above, depending on the parameters, adding uncertainty may either
increase or decrease the estimate of the i.e.s. compared to the model without uncertainty.
I use the distribution for the same shock estimated in Imai and Keane (2004), using
NLSY-data for the cohort aged 20 in 1979:
ln(εt) ∼ N
(
−120.05781
2, 0.057812
)
, t > 25
Further, I set the standard deviation of the initial shock, ε25, so that I match the education
specific distribution of wages in the data. The estimate of γ increases slightly from 0.44 to 0.45
when uncertainty is introduced into the model, see table 1.2. This is however considerably lower
than Imai and Keane (2004)’s estimate of 3.8, obtained using a similar model.36 Consistent
with the finding by Wallenius (2011), which shows that the high estimate obtained by Imai
and Keane is due to the choice of sample (age 20 to age 36), I find a much lower estimate than
Imai and Keane. Taking into account that wage uncertainty increases the estimate of the
i.e.s. slightly, the labor supply measure induces a substantially lower estimate also compared
to Wallenius.
The model fit for hours and wages are still good, see figure 1.10. Even though I do not
estimate the distribution of the human capital shock, and I do not target the variance of the
wages in the estimation, the model does surprisingly well in explaining most of the variance
for wages for both education groups. However, at older ages the variance levels off in the
model whereas it continues to grow for college educated in the data. The variance levels off as
the variance of the production of human capital decreases. With d positive, production of
36The difference in model between the one above and Imai and Keane (2004) should not influence the
estimate of the i.e.s. significantly; using the same deterministic model as above, Wallenius (2011) obtains
similar estimate to Imai and Keane (2004) when using the same age group.
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Table 1.2: Parameter estimates stochastic model, targeting age 25-60.
NCD CD
γ 0.4514 A 0.1094 0.2525
b 19.3419 d 0.0184 0.0344
β 0.9529 α 0.4593 0.4487
SSE 0.0101
Note: Targets based on monthly CPS data from
1979 to 2008. ’NCD’ refers to workers without a
College degree and ’CD’ refers to workers with a
College degree. SSE is the sum of squared errors.
The simulated targets are based on a draw of 10000
individuals.
human capital is more difficult with age, irrespective of human capital level and labor supply.
As a result, production of new human capital is very low for all older workers which together
with a positive rate of depreciation of human capital slow down the increase in the wage
dispersion.
Due to human capital, even a small wage shock can create a large increase in the variance
of wages, and due to different production function of human capital across age groups the
same shock gives rise to very different profiles for the variance of wages for the two groups.
As emphasized above, the i.e.s. is a state-dependent variable which can be computed
using equation 1.16. The i.e.s. varies considerably across age and education groups; for
non-college graduates the i.e.s. increases by about 58 percent whereas it more than doubles
college graduates, see figure 1.11. Interestingly, the only state variables that seems to matter
is age and education: the confidence interval around the conditional mean i.e.s., which is
computed using +/- two standard deviations of the conditional distribution, is narrow for
both education groups. Using population weights from the CPS and a 1/3 share of graduate
students, the average i.e.s. in the population is 0.35. This is 22 percent lower than the
estimate of γ. Again, interpreting the estimate of γ as an estimate of the i.e.s., overstates the
average substitutability of labor with respect to transitory wage changes in the population.
The results indicate that it is important to be cautious when comparing estimates of the i.e.s.
obtained from different samples with respect to age and education, as there is no reason to
expect that they should find the same estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution.
Shaw (1989) was the first to note that the i.e.s. is increasing with age due to human
capital accumulation, but she does not consider other state variables, and she cannot provide
quantitative estimates for different ages due to her choice of preferences. Thus, I cannot
compare my findings with her’s. Using a similar model Imai and Keane (2004) find that
the average (uncompensated) response in hours to a 2 percent unexpected wage increase
grows exponentially with age; whereas hours increase by 0.6 percent for workers in their
early twenties, hours increases by nearly 4 percent at age 60 and about 5.5 percent at age
65. Compared to Imai and Keane, I find both a much smaller response of hours at all ages,
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Figure 1.10: Model fit for hours, wages and the variance of wages with stochastic human
capital, targeting age 25-60.
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and a much smaller increase in the i.e.s. over the life cycle. However, Imai and Keane do
not control for the income effect, which also is age-dependent, which makes comparisons a
bit more difficult. The income effect is particularly important in models with human capital
as temporary wage changes have persistent effects on future wages. With a higher estimate
of the i.e.s., labor supply responds more to wage changes which increases the persistence of
the shock. Moreover, Imai and Keane do not distinguish between education groups, although
they estimate different production functions for different educational groups.
Domeij and Floden (2006) argue that ignoring liquidity constraints will bias the estimate
of the i.e.s. downwards. Once they exclude individuals likely to be liquidity constraint in
their sample, their estimate of the i.e.s. more than doubles.37 Human capital accumulation
is an alternative source of an estimation bias, but has also some implications for the bias
found when ignoring liquidity constraints. If liquidity constraint individuals are mainly young
workers, which I find has the lowest i.e.s. in the population, when excluding these workers
37However, the comparison is slightly wrong, as emphasised by Keane and Rogerson (2012), as credit
constraints as human capital breaks the direct mapping between the preference parameter and the labor supply
elasticity.
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Figure 1.11: Intertemporal elasticity of substitution over the life cycle with stochastic human
capital.
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Note: Age averages of simulated data. The dotted lines are +/- 2 standard deviation confidence intervals
for the i.e.s. calculated from the simulated data.
the average i.e.s. in the population will increase due to the sample selection effect, and not
only due to the importance of the liquidity constraint.
The state-dependency of the i.e.s. introduces some interesting policy implications with
respect to e.g. labor taxation; young workers and in particular young college graduates will
respond much less to contemporaneous tax changes than older workers. This implies that
economies with a high share old workers will have a more tax-sensitive workforce relative to
economies with a younger workforce. Also the distribution of education and or occupation
may matter; the ability to accumulate human capital through learning by doing, and the
value of human capital may differ significantly across education groups and occupations.
Thus, economies with workers with high gains from human capital accumulation, here college
graduates, will be less tax-sensitive, than economies with workers which have low gains from
human capital accumulation.
1.5 Robustness
Above, I assumed that both education groups had common preferences. This is however
possibly a strict assumption, as the two education groups differs significantly with respect to
wage growth and wage dispersion, they may also differ significantly with respect to disutility
of working. I therefore estimate the stochastic model without the assumption of common
preferences. However, as the identification of α is related to the assumption of common
preferences I assume that d is a common parameter as it is, together with α, and important
parameter for the curvature of the wage profile. The results are shown in table 1.3.38
Interestingly, when d is common, the estimates for γ are very similar across education groups,
but are somewhat higher compared to the case with common preferences. As the estimates of
γ are so similar across education groups, it is natural to ask why the estimate differs from the
38The change in results for the deterministic model is very similar, and are available upon request.
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estimate with common preferences. The reason is because the estimates of b and β also differ
across the two groups, which also affect the labor supply profile over the life cycle. However,
the model fit measured as the sum of squared errors is considerable worse than the model
with common preferences. However, the differences are small and if anything it strengthens
the finding that the i.e.s. is low even when the effects of human capital accumulation are
taken into account.
Table 1.3: Parameter estimates for the stochastic model with education specific preferences,
targeting age 25-60.
NCD CD
γ 0.4818 A 0.1506 γ 0.4825 A 0.2194
b 16.3581 d 0.0304 b 17.3107 d 0.0304
β 0.9530 α 0.3234 β 0.9535 α 0.4498
SSE 0.0540
Note: Targets based on monthly CPS data from 1979 to 2008. ’NCD’ refers
to workers without a College degree and ’CD’ refers to workers with a College
degree. SSE is the sum of squared errors. The simulated targets are based on a
draw of 10000 individuals.
As emphasized above, the estimate of γ is of limited interest when it comes to comparing
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution across the two model specifications, as this is also
influenced by the other parameters of the model. I therefore use equation (1.16) to compute
the i.e.s. using the simulated data, and compare the evolution of the i.e.s. across the two
models. For the model education specific preferences and common age-effect, d, the profiles for
the i.e.s. looks similar to the ones with common preferences, see figure 1.12. The increase in
the i.e.s. is common across the two models; for non-college graduates the i.e.s. increases more
with common preference, 58 percent versus 52 percent with uncommon preferences, whereas
for college graduates the i.e.s. increases more with uncommon preferences, 108 percent versus
115 percent.
In the estimation above, I have assumed log-utility. However, when facing uncertainty
the degree of risk aversion may affects the incentives to insure against this risk, and thus
affect labor supply decisions. As the need for insurance is largest for young workers, higher
risk aversion leads to higher labor supply when young, and thus the assumption of log-utility
may bias the estimates of γ downwards if the degree of risk aversion is considerably higher.
In order to test the sensitivity of my results with respect to risk aversion, I estimate the
stochastic model using a CRRA utility function
u(ct) =
c1−σt
1− σ ,
with a relative risk parameter, σ, of 2. The results are presented in table 1.4. As expected,
the estimate of γ increases. Notice that the fit, measure as the sum of squared errors, are
considerably worse than above. Again, to assess the changes in the intertemporal elasticity of
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Figure 1.12: Intertemporal elasticity of substitution over the life cycle with education specific
preferences.
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Note: Age averages of simulated data.
substitution of a higher risk aversion, I compute the life cycle path of the i.e.s.. For non-college
graduates, the i.e.s. increases by 18 percent which is much smaller compared to the increase
for log-utility. For college graduates it increases by 131 percent, compared to 108 percent
increase with log-utility. However, as the fit with higher risk aversion is considerably worse, it
is difficult to fully compare the estimates of the i.e.s. as they depend on the simulated data
which is much more similar to the actual data with log-utility.
Table 1.4: Parameter estimates for the stochastic model, with a relative risk aversion of 2.
Targeting age 25-60.
NCD CD
γ 0.5440 A 0.1021 0.1995
b 28.4848 d 0.0247 0.0234
β 0.9552 α 0.0990 0.5946
SSE 0.1416
Note: Targets based on monthly CPS data from
1979 to 2008. ’NCD’ refers to workers without a
College degree and ’CD’ refers to workers with a
College degree. SSE is the sum of squared errors.
The simulated targets are based on a draw of 10000
individuals.
1.6 Labor income taxation - Welfare analysis
When workers accumulate human capital the impact of transitory wage shocks on hours are
dampened, and more so for workers with a high return to human capital accumulation. Thus,
also the impact of transitory tax changes are smaller in the model estimated above, compared
to a standard model without human capital. In standard models without human capital, the
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Figure 1.13: Intertemporal elasticity of substitution over the life cycle with a risk aversion of
2.
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Note: Age averages of simulated data. The dotted lines are +/- 2 standard deviation confidence intervals
for the i.e.s. calculated from the simulated data.
response in hours to transitory wage changes exceeds the response in hours to permanent
wage changes. Then, the i.e.s./Frisch elasticity represents an upper bound on the response
of hours to permanent tax changes. However, as emphasized by Keane (2012) and Keane
and Rogerson (2012) the i.e.s. is not the best suited parameter to evaluate the effects of
permanent tax policies in models with human capital. First, with human capital the effect of
permanent tax changes may exceed the effect of transitory tax changes if the return to human
capital accumulation is large, or if the income effect is sufficiently small. Second, in contrast to
transitory tax changes, where human capital dampens the effect, with permanent tax changes
the role of human capital is to amplify the effect of taxes in the long-run. As Keane puts
it, human capital creates a "snowball effect"; increasing taxes permanently decreases today’s
labor supply, which reduces human capital accumulation. This reduces next periods wages,
and thus next periods labor supply, which further reduces human capital accumulation. Thus,
using the estimated i.e.s. for different age and education groups as an upper bound on the
response of hours to permanent changes in taxes may yield too low welfare costs associated
tax changes.
Keane (2012) finds that welfare costs of permanent tax changes in a model with human
capital are large, and 4 to 7 times larger than in a model with no human capital accumulation.
This is both due to the fact that human capital makes permanent tax changes exceed transitory
shocks for the youngest and the oldest worker, and because Keane finds that the snowball-effect
is very large. I revisit these findings using the model estimated in section 4. There are two
key differences between the model here and the model used by Keane (2012). First, Keane
uses an estimate of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution for soon-to-retire workers of
3.8, which is the i.e.s. estimated by Imai and Keane (2004). This is a very high estimate of
the i.e.s. compared to the rest of the literature, and about 10 times larger than what I obtain.
The welfare costs of permanent tax changes depends crucially on the size of the snowball
effect, which depends on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Second, Imai and Keane
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estimate their model using data on workers between age 20 and age 36. However, as found by
Wallenius (2011), the out-of sample performance of the model is poor. In particular, hours
declines too sharply after the age of 40, and so does wages. As the production function of
human capital features decreasing returns to scale, a too low level of labor supply is associated
with a too large change in human capital accumulation when hours change. The model fit of
hours and wages in the model estimated above is good for all ages and for both education
groups, and I take the good fit of hours and wages as a support of reasonable production
function estimates.
Before I turn to the welfare analysis of permanent tax changes, I look at the response
of both transitory and permanent shocks in the model estimated above, and compare the
findings with Keane (2012). I use the benchmark model estimated in section 4, which assumes
log utility. Thus, my results are only directly comparable with parts of the results obtained
by Keane, as he mostly uses a lower than unity risk aversion. The effects on labor supply of
an unexpected tax increase of 5% occurring at different ages are presented in table 1.5. The
first 4 columns looks at the response of hours for college and non-college workers to a 5%
temporary tax increase. In the uncompensated case, the tax income is just waste, whereas in
the compensated case, tax income is distributed back to the workers in a lump-sum form on a
yearly basis. In standard models without human capital, the change in hours to a transitory
shock exceeds the change in hours to a permanent shock. With human capital however,
changes in hours due to permanent tax changes can exceed the effect of transitory shocks.
This is the case if the return to human capital accumulation is sufficiently strong, or if the
income effect is small. Let’s first compare the transitory and permanent uncompensated tax
increase, column 1-2 and 5-6. As expected, with log utility the permanent uncompensated
effect is close to zero, except for older ages where the horizon of the tax increase is closer to
the transitory increase. Thus, for the uncompensated increase, with log utility, the standard
result holds that transitory changes have a larger effect than permanent. With compensated
tax increases, permanent tax changes have a larger effect than transitory changes for young
workers. And, the effect is strongest for college educated; for non-college educated permanent
tax changes have a larger effect on labor supply than transitory until the age of 30, whereas
for college educated the effect of permanent tax changes exceed the effect of transitory until
the age of 35. This is qualitatively similar to what Keane (2012) finds, which reports the
average of all workers. However, I find a smaller difference than Keane at young ages, and I do
not find that the permanent effect is larger for older workers as Keane does. Here, the effect
of permanent tax changes approaches the effect of transitory changes as workers approaches
retirement, but it never exceeds. Thus, using a much smaller estimate of the i.e.s., the result
that permanent tax changes may exceed transitory changes is maintained, but I find the
magnitude of this effect to be smaller than what Keane finds.
When taxes are permanent, not only does the immediate response of the economy matters,
but also, and possibly more important, are the long run effects of a tax change. To evaluate
the long run changes, I compute the changes in labor supply over the life cycle of a permanent
5% tax increase at age 25. Then, future wages are not only effected by the tax increase
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Table 1.5: Percentage change in labor supply in response to a 5 percent tax increase at the
indicated age.
Transitory (unanticipated) Permanent (unanticipated)
Uncompensated Compensated Uncompensated Compensated
NCD CD NCD CD NCD CD NCD CD
Age (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
25 −1.33 −0.95 −1.40 −1.04 −0.06 −0.05 −1.57 −1.62
30 −1.43 −1.10 −1.51 −1.23 −0.04 0.10 −1.56 −1.53
35 −1.54 −1.20 −1.61 −1.40 −0.05 0.17 −1.57 −1.49
40 −1.61 −1.50 −1.71 −1.61 −0.10 0.05 −1.59 −1.54
45 −1.71 −1.65 −1.82 −1.76 −0.22 −0.05 −1.64 −1.58
50 −1.79 −1.76 −1.92 −1.90 −0.42 −0.25 −1.70 −1.65
55 −1.88 −1.86 −2.03 −2.02 −0.77 −0.63 −1.82 −1.77
60 −1.93 −1.92 −2.13 −2.14 −1.45 −1.38 −2.03 −2.01
Note: Response in hours to a 5tax income is distributed back in a lump-sum form, on a
yearly basis. NCD refers to workers without a college degree, whereas CD refers to workers
with a college degree.
directly, but also indirectly through lower human capital accumulation due to lower labor
supply. This is the snowball effect, which Keane (2012) finds to be very important. The
change in hours and pre-tax wages over the life cycle for the log-utility model is given in
table 1.6. For comparison, I have also included the changes in hours and wages in the Imai
and Keane (2004) model, which assumes a risk aversion of 0.74, taken from Keane (2012).
Pre-tax wages falls by much less compared to the Imai and Keane model. This is due to a
lower response in hours, which is due to a much lower estimate of the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution, and also due to the model fit. In the model by Imai and Keane simulated
hours after the age of 40 are substantially lower than in the data. With decreasing returns to
scale, this translates into a too large change in human capital production, as the production
per unit is substantially larger than for higher levels of labor supply. Thus, it seems that the
large snowball effect found by Keane hinges on a large estimate of the i.e.s..
By comparing the change in hours for older non-college and college workers in table 1.6
with the ones in the last two columns of table 1.5, it is evident that the change in hours are
smaller when the tax change occurred at the beginning of the working life. The snowball
effect is apparently not large enough to outweigh the income effect. Although workers are
compensated for their tax payments, they are not compensated for the loss of future income
due to lower human capital accumulation. Part of the decrease in wages is compensated
through higher labor supply, thus reducing the long-run labor supply effect of a permanent
tax change. This is in sharp contrast to the findings by Keane, which finds that due to the
large snowball effect the reduction in hours at age 60 of a permanent tax increase that started
at age 25 is double the effect of a transitory tax increase at age 60.
Given the much smaller snow-ball effect of human capital, I expect to find much lower
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Table 1.6: Effects of permanent tax increase on labor supply and wages at different ages. A
comparison of the response of the model estimated in section 4.2 with the model of Imai and
Keane (2004). Percent.
Benchmark model Imai and Keane (2004)
NCD CD
Age Hours Wage* Hours Wage* Hours Wage*
25 −1.57 − −1.62 − −2.7 −
30 −1.62 −0.16 −1.65 −0.24 −2.9 −0.4
35 −1.66 −0.32 −1.70 −0.45 −3.2 −0.7
40 −1.70 −0.46 −1.70 −0.64 −3.8 −1.0
45 −1.74 −0.60 −1.74 −0.80 −5.1 −1.3
50 −1.77 −0.72 −1.77 −0.93 −7.9 −2.0
55 −1.80 −0.84 −1.80 −1.05 −13.3 −3.6
60 −1.82 −0.95 −1.82 −1.15 −19.3 −7.5
62/65∗ −1.84 −0.99 −1.84 −1.18 −29.2 −11.6
Note: The tax change is a 5 percentage point permanent tax increase which is
distributed back in a lump-sum form, on a yearly basis. The effects from the model
by Imai and Keane (2004) are taken from Keane (2012).
* Reduction in pre-tax wages
welfare costs of tax changes compared to Keane (2012). I use two measures to evaluate the
long-run welfare costs of taxes. Since I have a dynamic model from age 25 to death, it is
natural to look at the change in the life time utility at age 25, measured in consumption
equivalents. I also look at the change in life time consumption, discounted to age 25. I keep
the assumption that taxes are distributed back in a lump-sum manner. In response to a 5
percentage points permanent tax increase welfare, measured in consumption equivalents, is
reduced by about 0.04 percent for workers with and without a college degree, respectively, see
table 1.7. The reduction in life time consumption is much larger, where consumption falls
by 1.99 percent for workers without a College degree and 2.21 percent for College graduates.
Thus a substantial part of the drop in consumption is compensated by an increase in the
utility from leisure.
Table 1.7: Welfare losses and consumption losses of a 5 percentage points tax increase
Benchmark model No Human Capital
NCD CD (A = 0, δ = 0)
∆C∗ −0.04 −0.04 −0.04
∆C −1.99 −2.21 −1.50
Note: The tax income is distributed back in a lump-sum
form, on a yearly basis. ∆C is the change in life-time
consumption, discounted to age 25. ∆C∗ is the welfare
loss measured in consumption equivalents.
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Welfare losses, measured by the fall consumption, increases by 33 percent higher for
workers without a college degree and by 47 percent higher for College graduates compared to
the model with no human capital. Comparing welfare losses in consumption equivalents, the
welfare loss is the same whether or not workers accumulate. This is because increase utility
from leisure compensates for a large fraction of the consumption drop. The increase in welfare
loss is significantly lower than what Keane finds, where human capital increases the loss by
4-7 times. For the sake of comparison with Keane, the welfare costs reported are the long-run
costs, and do not include costs along the transition. However, I expect the changes along the
transition to be similar to the long-run costs, as the response of hours in table 1.5 and 1.6
are very similar. Potentially more importantly, however, is the failure to take into account
the welfare costs of a reduction in human capital accumulation. However, this requires a
general equilibrium model. But, as I find the reduction in human capital of a 5 percentage
points permanent tax increase to be relatively modest, I expect that the welfare costs of this
reduction in human capital is modest.
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper I argue that the average i.e.s. is low, and comparable with micro estimates,
even in the presence of human capital accumulation. This is due to the findings that (i) a
large share of the increase in the extensive margin early in the working life should not be
included as changes in optimal labor supply, and (ii) human capital accumulation implies a
state-dependent intertemporal elasticity of substitution, which makes the average elasticity
lower than the estimated utility parameter. First, when estimating the i.e.s. there is an
important distinction to be made between voluntary and involuntary quits. This is because
involuntary quits are not a choice by the worker, and should therefore not be included
in the measure of labor supply when estimating the i.e.s.. Using monthly data on labor
market transitions taken from the CPS I show that the majority of unemployment spells are
involuntary. Moreover, I find that most of the changes in the extensive margin of labor supply
occurs early in life, and is due to either involuntary unemployment or due to a sample effect
caused by students leaving university and starting to work throughout the year. Second, when
workers accumulate human capital the i.e.s. is no longer only a function of the preference
parameters, but a state-dependent variable that crucially depends on the return to human
capital accumulation. I identify two import sources of heterogeneity with respect to return to
human capital accumulation; age and education, and show that the i.e.s. is increasing in age
and decreasing in education.
To quantify the importance of the state-dependency of the i.e.s. and the empirical measure
of labor supply, I estimate a life cycle model with endogenous labor supply along the intensive
margin, human capital accumulation through learning by doing and wage uncertainty, using
cohort data on white males from CPS for workers with and without a college degree. I target
only the intensive margin of labor supply, and find an estimate of the i.e.s. for soon-to-
retire-workers of 0.45. However, there are significant differences across age and education;
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the estimate of the i.e.s. for workers aged 25 is 0.22 and 0.29 for workers with and without
a College degree, respectively. Second, at young ages non-college workers have 32 percent
higher i.e.s. than young college educated. Using population weights calculated from the CPS,
and a share of 1/3 college graduates, the average i.e.s. in the population is 0.35. Thus, the
average elasticity is well below the estimate of the i.e.s. for workers soon-to-retire, which is
identical to the estimate of the (inverse) curvature of the marginal disutility of labor. The
increase in the i.e.s. over the life cycle is however significantly lower than what Imai and
Keane finds in a similar model, when looking at uncompensated changes in labor supply.
I perform robustness checks on two of my key assumptions, namely the assumption of
common preferences across education groups and log-utility of consumption. Relaxing these
assumptions yields small changes in the estimates, and the key conclusions are not altered; the
estimate of the average intertemporal elasticity of substitution is low, and the i.e.s. increases
significantly over the life cycle.
Finally, I revisit the findings by Keane (2012), which argue that once the effects of human
capital is taken into account the long-run welfare costs of tax changes are large, and more
than 4-7 times larger than in conventional models. This is because human capital amplifies
the long-run effect of taxes through a "snowball-effect"; lower labor supply today reduces
human capital accumulation, and thus reduces future wages which again reduces future labor
supply. Using the model estimated above, I find that the importance of the snowball-effect
hinges on the high estimate of the i.e.s. used by Keane in the analysis (3.8); The welfare
costs of a permanent 5 percentage points tax increase in the model estimated above, with an
average i.e.s. of 0.35, implies a welfare loss, measured in consumption loss, of 1.99 percent
and 2.12 percent for non-college and college workers, compared to a loss of 1.5 percent loss
for both education groups in the same model without human capital. So, although human
capital do increase the loss of taxation, the difference is much smaller than previously found.
The analysis is however, as Keane’s, partial equilibrium analysis, which may understate the
importance of human capital, as the productivity costs of reduced human capital accumulation
is not taken into account.
The state-dependency of the i.e.s. and the difference in estimation bias across different
samples in terms of age and education indicate that one should be cautious when comparing
estimates of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution obtained from different samples with
respect to e.g. the age and education distribution. Moreover, the state-dependency of the
i.e.s. has important policy implications, as the substitutability of labor depends on age and
ability to accumulate human capital. Thus, both the age structure of the economy and the
education/occupation structure of the economy may matter significantly for the effect of e.g.
tax changes on average labor supply. These effects are however not explored here, but are
topics for future work.
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A State-dependent i.e.s.
I define the intertemporal elasticity of substitution as the percentage change in the intertem-
poral labor supply to a one percent temporary increase in the rental rate on human capital,
pht , (phj = 0,∀j 6= t), keeping marginal utility of consumption fixed:
i.e.s. =
d
(
nt
nt+1
)
dpht
pht
nt
nt+1
(A.1)
Rewriting this yields
i.e.s. = dnt
dpht
pht
nt
−
(
∂nt+1
∂kt+1
dkt+1
dpht
+ ∂nt+1
∂ht+1
dht+1
dpht
)
pht
nt+1
. (A.2)
Without human capital, the last term in parenthesis would have been zero and the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution would have been identical to the Frisch elasticity. However, with
human capital, also future labor supply responds to changes in today’s rental rate, as this
affects future wages through today’s production of human capital.
I the following I assume, as in the model, that preferences are separable in consumption
and leisure, and in time, and that production of human capital is linear in the capital stock,
∂2Gt+1
∂h2t+1
= 0. Given the functional forms, there are no analytical solutions for the policy
functions. I therefore take the total derivative of the first order condition for labor, equation
(1.14), imposing that dht = dkt = 0 :
dnt
dpht
= 1(
b 1γn
1
γ
−1
t − µt ∂2Gt∂n2t
) (u′(ct)εtht + ∂Gt
∂nt
dµt
dpht
)
. (A.3)
The derivative of the shadow price on skills with respect to an increase in the current
price on skills, is given by
dµt
dpht
= βEt
(1− δ + ∂Gt+1
∂ht+1
)
dµt+1
dpht
+
bn
1
γ
t+1
ht+1
dnt+1
dpht
 , (A.4)
where I have used the first order condition for nt+1 and the linearity of Gt+1in h, so that
ht
∂2Gt+1
∂ht+1nt+1
= ∂Gt+1∂nt+1 .
The total derivative of future variables depends only on human capital, and not on future
capital stocks. The proof for this is the following: Using the budget constraints, and the law
of motion for human capital, we know that
ht+2
(
1− dkt+2
dkt+1
)
dnt+2
dkt+2
=
(
dkt+3
dht+2
− nt+2
)
dGt+1
dnt+1
dnt+1
dkt+1
. (A.5)
Then, if for any t : dntdkt = 0,
dnt
dkt
= 0 ∀t. Looking at the derivative of the first order
condition for labor with respect to capital in period T, dnTdkT , this is zero, as µT = 0,and given
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that u′(ct) = 0 by assumption. Moreover, from the first order condition for labor supply in
any period
dnt+2
dkt+2
= 1
b 1γn
1
γ
−1
t − µt+2 ∂
2Gt+2
∂n2t+2
∂Gt+2
∂nt+2
dµt+2
dkt+2
, (A.6)
we see that as dntdkt = 0 ∀t, so is also
dµt
dkt
= 0,∀t. So, labor supply responds only to human
capital (and the rental rate). Hence dnt+1
dpht
= ∂nt+1∂ht+1
dht+1
dpht
, and dµt
dpht
simplifies to
dµt
dpht
= βEt
(1− δ + ∂Gt+1
∂ht+1
)
∂µt+1
∂ht+1
+
bn
1
γ
t+1
ht+1
∂nt+1
∂ht+1
 dht+1
dpht
. (A.7)
Moreover, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution simplifies to
i.e.s. = dnt
dpht
pht
nt
(
1− ∂nt+1
∂ht+1
∂Gt
∂nt
nt
nt+1
)
(A.8)
Now, one only needs to find dnt+1dht+1 as a function of
∂µt+1
∂ht+1
, so that dµt
dpht
can be solved
recursively. This is obtained from the FOC of labor
dnt+1
dht+1
= 1(
b 1γn
1
γ
−1
t+1 − µt+1 ∂
2Gt+1
∂n2t+1
)
bn
1
γ
t+1
ht+1
+ ∂Gt+1
∂nt+1
dµt+1
dht+1
 (A.9)
Then, the i.e.s. is obtained from solving the following system of equations recursively
iest =
dnt
dpht
pht
nt
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∂nt
nt
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)
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1
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.
In the estimated models above γ
(
∂Gt
∂nt
)2
Ψt ≈ 0, and ∂nt+1∂ht+1 ∂Gt∂nt ntnt+1 ≈ 0, so the i.e.s.
simplifies to
iest ≈ γ 1
bn
1
γ
−1
t − γµt ∂2Gt∂n2t
u′(ct)εtht
pht
nt
(A.10)
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B Additional estimation results
This appendix shows some additional estimation results. First, I show the estimation results
for the model without uncertainty when I fix α at 0.2, 0.4, and 0.6. This is to ensure
that α is indeed identified in the approach above. Indeed, the sum of squared errors shows
some variability for the different value of α, and the model with best fit is when the α′s are
constrained to be 0.4, which is close to the estimated values above (αNCD = 0.48, αCD = 0.47),
see table B.1. Moreover, all models estimate a low value of γ, and the dispersion is estimates
are low.
Table B.1: Parameter estimates with pre set values of α.
α = 0.2 α = 0.4 α = 0.6
γ 0.4076 0.4612 0.4778
b 21.2701 18.4737 18.9417
β 0.9628 0.9576 0.9531
NCD CD NCD CD NCD CD
A 0.0838 0.2129 0.1043 0.2457 0.1301 0.2876
d 0.0170 0.0354 0.0184 0.0348 0.0198 0.0348
SSE 0.0137 0.0084 0.0128
Note: Estimations of the model without uncertainty.
As an alternative approach, I also estimate the model assuming a common age-effect in
the production of human capital. The results are given in table B.2, and again confirms that
γ is low and similar to the value estimated in section 4.2 (γ = 0.45). However, the model fit
is considerably worse.
Table B.2: Parameter estimates with common d.
NCD CD
γ 0.4790 A 0.1574 0.2160
b 16.8262 d 0.0311
β 0.9538 α 0.3416 0.4034
SSE 0.0620
Note: Estimations of the model with uncer-
tainty.
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2 Optimal Labor Market Policies
- The Importance of Heterogeneous Re-
turns to Labor Market Experience
2.1 Introduction
A central topic in public finance is how to provide unemployment insurance (UI) to the
population without distorting search incentives. Search incentives are typically distorted
due to a moral hazard problem arising because search effort by unemployed workers are
unobservable to the social planner. Moreover, if the government does not have access to lump-
sum taxation, and for example, if labor income taxes are used to finance the UI, taxes also
distorts the search effort as taxes widens the wedge between the social gain of re-employment
and the private gain.1
In this paper, I argue that both the moral hazard problem and the distortionary effects of
labor income taxes on search effort, which I will refer to as a tax distortion problem, greatly
depends on the assumptions about wage growth over the life cycle. The literature on optimal
UI typically assumes that wages evolves exogenously when employed.2 This is in stark contrast
to the empirical literature, which has extensively documented a positive relationship between
contemporaneous labor effort and future wages.3 Given this evidence, our starting point is a
‘learning-by-doing’ framework, where current labor hours increase future productivity.
A positive return to labor market experience has an important effect on the moral hazard
problem of UI for young workers as shown by Michelacci and Ruffo (2011). In particular,
it lowers the moral hazard problem associated with UI as young workers have a strong
private incentive to search for a job to accumulate high return human capital. Whereas the
moral hazard problem traditionally has been viewed as the main cost associated with UI,
the presence of a career-effect substantially increases the social costs associated with tax
distortions, which are created by the need to finance the UI and other expenses. With a
career-effect, taxes not only reduces the private return of re-employment by lowering after-tax
1Note that any tax, including lump-sum taxes, which is specific to employed workers will distort the search
effort decision.
2For early contributors to this literature, see e.g. Shavell and Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn and Nicolini
(1997).
3See e.g. Blundell and Macurdy (1999) and the references therein.
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wages but also by reducing the return to human capital accumulation.4 The latter is important
as contemporaneous distortions of search effort has long lasting effects on future productivity
and wages through both a larger depreciation and reduced accumulation of human capital.5
And, the higher the tax the larger is the gap between the gross return to human capital, which
is the social return to human capital accumulation, and the after-tax return to human capital
accumulation, which is the private return. Thus, whereas search effort may respond little to
changes in benefits, as the moral hazard problem is low, search effort may be substantially
below the optimal level due to the distortionary effects of labor income taxes.
Both the moral hazard problem and the tax distortion problem are likely to change
substantially over the life cycle, as the return to human capital accumulation and the
productivity level change over the life cycle. Moreover, as different groups of the population
face different returns to human capital accumulation, the problems most likely also vary across
the population by e.g. the level of education.
The goal of this paper is to measure the magnitude of the moral hazard problem and
the tax distortion problem associated with US labor market policies, taking the effects of
(heterogeneous) labor market experience into account. In particular, I want to asses (i) if
unemployed workers, given the US labor market policies, on average search enough from a
social perspective, (ii) if there are any differences between age and education groups, and
(iii) what is the relative importance of moral hazard and the distortionary effects of taxes.
To this end, I develop a life cycle model which features unemployment, endogenous search
effort, and human capital accumulation (learning-by-doing) when employed and human capital
depreciation during unemployment. To obtain the deviation between the socially optimal
search effort and the search effort exerted by unemployed workers I proceed in two steps.
First, I estimate the model by indirect inference methods to match US data in the period 1979
to 2008, both in terms of key variables and labor market policies. I split the sample into three
education groups; low (less than High School), medium (High School degree and some College)
and high (College degree), and allow for education and age specific production of human
capital, job separation probabilities and job finding probabilities. Looking at the profile of
real wages over the life cycle, the education groups represent three different degrees of the
return to human capital accumulation: no, medium and high return. Second, I compute the
education specific optimal contract provided by a planner who maximizes workers utility under
the assumption of unobservable search effort. By comparing the search effort of unemployed
workers in the benchmark model with the search effort specified in the optimal contract, I
obtain a measure of the deviation from the optimal search effort by all education and age
groups.
4For a thorough discussion of tax policies and human capital formation see e.g. Heckman et al. (1998) and
the reference therein.
5The distortionary effects of labor income taxes on the human capital accumulation of employed workers
are not studied here. The distortionary effects on search effort presented here are thus a lower bound, as they
do not take into account future labor supply effects of reduced human capital accumulation.
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A comparison of search effort in the optimal contract with the search effort in the estimated
model yields three main findings: First, the deviation of search effort from the optimal level
is inversely related to the return to experience.6 That is, the deviation of search effort is
increasing in age, whereas the return to experience is decreasing in age. And, the deviation
of search effort is decreasing in education whereas the return to experience is increasing in
education. Under the benchmark specification, I find that search effort on average is 21, 11.5
and 9.5 percent lower than the socially optimal level for workers with low, medium and high
education, respectively. Moreover, whereas the deviation is constant over the life cycle for
the low educated, who have zero return to experience, the deviation increases from about 8
percent (6 percent) at age 25 to 14 percent (13 percent) at age 60 for workers with medium
(high) education. The increase over the life cycle is mainly due to an increase in the moral
hazard problem, and, to a lesser extent, an increase in the labor tax distortions.
Second, the main social costs associated with unemployment insurance for workers with a
positive career-effect are not due to moral hazard problems, but are due a labor income tax
needed to finance government expenses, that distorts search effort and thus human capital
accumulation. I isolate the importance of moral hazard by comparing the optimal contract
with the search effort exerted by workers who face no taxes, as tax distortions vanish if taxes
are zero. Note that the measure of the moral hazard problem is a relative measure, and
only takes into account the "excess" moral hazard problem relative to the optimal contract.
However, under the reasonable assumption of unobservable search effort, the optimal contract
is a natural benchmark. For highly educated workers the moral hazard problem is close to
zero for young workers and accounts for about 25 percent of the total deviation from the
optimal contract for older workers. For workers with medium education the moral hazard
problem accounts for below 20 percent of the total deviation for young workers and increases
to about 45− 50 percent for older workers. The importance of moral hazard is constant at 70
percent for low educated workers. Hence, estimates of the moral hazard costs for younger
workers with medium to high education may be informative about how a small change in
unemployment insurance affect search effort, but it is of limited use to measure the degree to
which search effort deviates from the socially optimal effort.
And, third, the deviation from optimal search effort increases in the degree of tax progres-
sivity and decreases in the degree of benefit regressivity. When replacing the benchmark tax
function, which features some progressiveness, with a linear tax, the deviation from optimal
search effort falls by an average of 1.2 percentage points for workers with a High School
degree and some College, and by 1.6 percentage points for College graduates.7 The effect
is however largest for young workers. When introducing a maximum value on per period
benefits, calibrated to match the US system, the replacement rate becomes regressive for
6Throughout the paper I will, for simplicity, refer to the search effort specified by the optimal contract as
the optimal search effort. As that is the search effort that is optimal under the realistic assumption that search
effort is unobservable to the planner. However, this is only the constrained optimal effort as welfare would be
improved if effort was observable.
7Workers without a High School diploma falls within the first tax bracket, and face a linear tax also in the
benchmark policy scheme.
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income levels where the maximum benefit binds. For College graduates, where the effect of
maximum benefits is largest, the deviation from optimal search effort falls from an average of
9.9 percent to an average of 3.8 percent. And, the deviation from optimal effort is then larger
for younger workers compared to older workers as young workers now face more generous UI
than older workers. For workers with a High School degree and some College the effect is
smaller, with a decrease in the average deviation from 11.5 to 9.5 percent. Also for this group
is the effect strongest for older workers, but the deviation is still increasing with age.
The paper is related to the literature on the optimal design of labor market institutions
when search effort is unobservable started by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), and which has
been extended to include several features also present in this paper.8 This literature typically
considers an initially unemployed worker with employment as an absorbing state and with a
constant re-employment income. In contrast, the main features of the model used here are
heterogeneous human capital accumulation/depreciation across age and education, recurrent
unemployment spells, and a life cycle dimension. These issues has been separately addressed
in the existing literature, but has to my knowledge not been analyzed jointly. Hopenhayn
and Nicolini (2009) introduces recurrent unemployment spells and focus on employment
history contingent benefits. Sopraseuth et al. (2007) includes a life cycle dimension and argues
that re-employment taxes are less effective in a life cycle model due to the shorter horizon.
Recently, human capital has been included, see e.g. Pavoni (2009) which analyses the effects of
deterioration of job opportunities due to human capital depreciation on the optimal contract.
In a more closely related paper, Michelacci and Ruffo (2011) analyses moral hazard
problems in a life cycle model similar to the one presented here.9 Using US data they show
that the moral hazard problem of young workers are smaller compared to the problem for
older workers. They argue that because the moral hazard problem is mild for younger workers,
whereas the need for insurance is substantial, it is welfare improving to increase UI for young
workers and decrease it for older workers. And, by introducing an age-dependent benefit
and tax schedule they move the economy close to the first best. The analysis presented here
extends the study by Michelacci and Ruffo by introducing heterogeneity across education
groups. Taking taxes as given in the benchmark model, I show that the search effort for all
ages and education groups lies well below the effort set in the optimal contract due to the
distortions created by labor income taxes. The findings in this paper thus complements the
results by Michelacci and Ruffo, and shows that unless major labor income tax reforms are
undertaken at the same time as the UI benefits are increased for young workers, an increase
in benefits for young workers will widen the gap between the search effort exerted and socially
optimal search effort. Moreover, I find large differences in the optimal contract offered to
the three education groups, as their career-effects varies substantially. Whereas the average
replacement rate is falling with age and the average tax rate is increasing in age for the two
highest education groups, the average replacement rate and tax rate is constant across age
8See also Pavoni and Violante (2007), Shimer and Werning (2008), Rendahl (2007), and Pavoni et al. (2013).
9Note that in contrast to the model presented here, Michelacci and Ruffo (2011) assumes that young workers
are credit constrained. Thus, labor market policies which shifts income from older ages to young ages are
particulary welfare improving in their set-up.
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for the low educated group. This reflects the wage patterns of the education groups and the
consumption smoothing motive of the planner. Thus, implementing the policy proposed by
Michelacci and Ruffo, where benefits are very generous for young workers and very low for
older workers, do not seem optimal for low educated workers. The results presented below
indicates that any implementation of the optimal contract should not only take age differences
into account, but also differences in career-effects.
The paper is also related to the literature which empirically measures the moral hazard
problem. Typically, moral hazard is measured by the response of unemployment duration
to benefits.10 Both Meyer and Mok (2007) and Michelacci and Ruffo (2011) find that the
elasticity of unemployment duration to benefits is close to zero for young workers, whereas
the elasticity is much larger for older workers. The analysis below supports a low moral
hazard costs for young High School graduates, but finds a constant moral hazard problem for
workers with less than High School. Moreover, I find that although social costs associated
with moral hazard are low there could still substantial deviation from the optimal search
effort for unemployed workers due to the tax distortion problem.
The paper proceeds as follows; Section 2 explains the model and the optimal contract
offered by a benevolent planner. Section 3 presents the estimation results obtained using
indirect inference methods, and section 4 discusses the deviation of search effort in the model
compared to the search effort specified in the optimal contract. The optimal contract is
discussed in more detail in section 5, and finally section 6 concludes.
2.2 Model
I first present the benchmark model before I discuss the optimal contract offered by the
planner which does not observe the costly search effort exerted by unemployed workers.
2.2.1 Benchmark model
This section presents the benchmark life-model used in the policy analysis below. The key
model features are (i) costly search effort of unemployed, (ii) human capital accumulation
through learning by doing and (iii) a finite life span. As the paper studies optimal unemploy-
ment schemes, unemployment and costly search effort are natural ingredients. Endogenous
wage growth due to human capital accumulation is important as it affect the search elasticity
w.r.t. to UI, as shown by Michelacci and Ruffo (2011).11 Finally, a finite life span is important
as both the need for insurance against unemployment shocks and the importance of the human
capital accumulation varies substantially with age.
The model is a discrete-time life cycle model for a finitely lived worker. Workers live for
tw + tr periods, where the first tw periods are spent working whereas the last tr are spent in
10See Chetty (2008) for a discussion of why the elasticity of unemployment duration to benefits may
overestimate the moral hazard problems due to liquidity constraints.
11The human capital accumulation also affects the elasticity of labor supply with respect to taxes, as shown
by e.g. Imai and Keane (2004), Keane (2011) and in chapter 1 of this thesis. However, to keep the analysis
simple, labor supply is assumed to be inelastic here. For more details, see the text.
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retirement. The agent has separable preferences over consumption, c, and search effort, e,
given by
Et
tw+tr∑
t=0
βt [u(ct)− g(et)] , (2.1)
I assume that u(·) is strictly increasing and strictly concave, whereas g(·) is strictly increasing
and strictly convex. Both are assumed to be continuously differentiable. In any period, within
the working age, the worker could either be unemployed, ε = 0, or employed, ε = 1. If the
worker is employed he supplies a fixed amount of hours, and receives an hourly wage equal to
his productivity level which is determined by the human capital level, h. The law of motion
for human capital for employed and unemployed workers are given by
ht+1 = G(ht, at), if εt = 1, Gh > 0, (2.2)
ht+1 = (1− δh)ht, if εt = 0, 0 ≤ δh < 1, (2.3)
where at is the age of the worker at time t. The effect of age on the production of human capital
is not restricted to be positive or negative in the theoretical model, but will be estimated
below. By assumption, unemployed workers are not producing human capital.12
Workers can save and borrow in a risk-less asset, kt. The intertemporal budget constraint
for the working periods is given by
ct + kt+1 ≤ (1 + r)kt + εtτ(ht) + (1− εt)B(ht), εt ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ t ≤ tw, (2.4)
where r is the interest rate. Unemployed workers receive unemployment benefits, B(ht), which
is a function of foregone earnings.13 The after tax income is given by the function τ(ht),
which allows for progressive taxation. Note that (i) the tax distortions in the model arise
from the endogeneity of wages and (ii) it only distorts the search effort decision of workers.
This is convenient as the focus of the paper is on distortions of search effort. Note however
that it implies that the distortions found are to be seen as a lower bound: if labor supply was
elastic, taxes would also distort the accumulation of human capital of employed workers, of
course in addition to distorting the labor-leisure choice. Thus, the wedge between the private
cost of unemployment and the social cost of unemployment would be even larger.
The timing of the model is as follows: at the end of the period t− 1 a fraction δt of the
jobs separate and the workers becomes unemployed. During period t unemployed workers
exert costly search effort to find a job, which is productive from the beginning of period t+ 1.
The job finding probability is given by the function pie(et, at), which is increasing in effort,
pie(et, at) > 0. The effect of age is left unsigned for now, and will be estimated below.
12This is of course a stark assumption, since many unemployed attend job training courses etc. However, it
seems reasonable that employed on average have a higher human capital accumulation than unemployed.
13To reduce the state space I assume that benefits are a function of this periods foregone earnings, and not
of last periods earnings.
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Employed workers maximize utility subject to the budget constraint, equation (2.4), and
the law of motion for human capital, equation (2.2). The recursive formulation is given by
V e(kt, ht, t) = max
cet ,kt+1
{u(cet ) + β ((1− δt)V e(kt+1, ht+1, t+ 1) + δtV u(kt+1, ht+1, t+ 1))}(2.5)
s.t (2.6)
cet = (1 + r)kt + τ(ht)− kt+1, (2.7)
ht+1 = G(ht, at), (2.8)
at = f(t), (2.9)
ktw+tr+1 = 0, (2.10)
where f(·) is the function that maps time to age.
Unemployed workers maximizes utility subject to the budget constraint, equation (2.4),
and the law of motion for human capital for unemployed workers, equation (2.3). The recursive
formulation is given by
V u(kt, ht, t) = max
cut ,kt+1,
et∈[0,1]
{
u(cut )− g(et) + β
(
pie(et, at)V e(kt+1, ht+1, t+ 1)
+(1− pie(et, at))V u(kt+1, ht+1, t+ 1)
)}
(2.11)
s.t (2.12)
cut = (1 + r)kt +B(ht)− kt+1, (2.13)
ht+1 = (1− δh)ht, (2.14)
at = f(t), (2.15)
ktw+tr+1 = 0. (2.16)
When workers retire, they receive pensions equal to a fraction pi of their actual (or
counterfactual) earning in the last working period, t = tw. The value of retirement, R, is given
by
R(kt, ht) =
1− βnr
1− β u
(
τ(pihtw) +
1− β
1− βnr (1 + r)ktw+1
)
. (2.17)
2.2.2 Optimal contract
Consider a planner who must design an optimal unemployment insurance program and a tax
program to finance the UI system (and pensions). The planner is assumed to be risk neutral
and discounts at the same rate as the workers. When the planner cannot observe search effort
the provision of unemployment insurance distorts search incentives and creates moral hazard
problems. I assume that the planner can observe the worker’s age, human capital level (which
is equivalent to the labor income), and her asset position. The planner can also observe if
agents have lost their job or not, and I assume that all job-losses are involuntary. I thus
abstract from all issues related to eligibility of UI benefits based on whether or not the worker
quit the job or was laid off, see Hopenhayn and Nicolini (2009).
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I follow the recursive contract theory and characterize the optimal scheme using con-
tinuation utility as a sufficient statistic for the workers history. Let vjt be the discounted
utility promised to the worker in period t if the worker is employed, j = e, or if the worker is
unemployed, j = u. Given the states (t, ht, vet ) the planner chooses taxes, T, which may be
negative, and continuation utilities for both states, ve/ut+1, such that they minimize the total
discounted costs, Ce(t, ht, vet ) :
Ce(t, ht, vet ) = min
Tt,vet+1,v
u
t+1
−Tt + β
[
(1− δt)Ce(t+ 1, ht+1, vet+1) + δCu(t+ 1, h′, vut+1)
]
,(2.18)
s.t.
vet ≤ u(ht − Tt) + β
[
(1− δt)vet+1 + δtvut+1
]
, (2.19)
ht+1 = G(ht, at), (2.20)
subject to the promise keeping constraint, equation (2.19), and the law of motion for human
capital, equation (2.20).
The problem of the employed is trivial, as there are no information problems. For workers
who have lost their jobs however, the planner face the trade-off between (unemployment)
insurance and (search) incentives. The principal sets the unemployment benefit, Bt, and the
continuation utilities for both states, ve/ut+1, such that they provide incentives to exert the
optimal amount of effort, e∗t , and at the same time minimize the cost function, Cu(t, ht, vut ).
The minimization problem for job searchers is given by
Cu(t, ht, vut ) = min
Bt,et,
vet+1,v
u
t+1
Bt + β
[
pi(et, at)Ce(t+ 1, ht+1, vet+1)
+(1− pi(et, at))Cu(t+ 1, ht+1, vut+1)
]
(2.21)
s.t.
vut = u(Bt)− g(et) + β
[
pi(et, at)vet+1 + (1− pi(et, at))vut+1
]
, (2.22)
et = arg max
x∈[0,1]
−g(x) + β [pi(x, at)vet+1 + (1− pi(x, at))vut+1] , (2.23)
ht+1 = (1− δh)ht, (2.24)
where equation(2.22) is the promise-keeping constraint for job searchers and equation(2.23) is
the incentive compatibility constraint.
Finally, the worker retires at age tw + 1, and the cost of promising utility vr at retirement
is equal to
Cr(t, ht, vrt ) =
1− βnr
1− β p, (2.25)
where p is the constant consumption level after retirement that solves
vrt =
1− βnr
1− β u(p). (2.26)
The maximum utility, v∗, attained by all workers at birth is obtained by solving
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Cs(1, h1, v∗) = c˜, (2.27)
where c˜ is the exogenously set total net cost of the policies, discounted to period 1.
Some Characterization of the optimal contract
The first order conditions for employed workers are given by
λPKet =
1
u′(ht − Tt) , (2.28)
Cevet+1(t+ 1, ht+1, v
e
t+1) = λPKet , (2.29)
Csvut+1(t+ 1, ht+1, v
u
t+1) = λPKet . (2.30)
The first order conditions of the problem for the job searchers are given by
Cev′e(t+ 1, ht+1, v
e
t+1) =
1
u′(Bt)
+ λICt
pi′(et, at)
pi(et, at)
(2.31)
Csv′u(t+ 1, ht+1, v
u
t+1) =
1
u′(Bt)
− λICt
pi′(et, at)
1− pi(et, at) (2.32)
λICt =
pi′(et, at)β
(
Cu(t+ 1, ht+1, vut+1)− Ce(t+ 1, ht+1, vet+1
)
(g′′(et)− βpi′′(et, at)
[
vet+1 − vut+1
]
) (2.33)
Rearranging the first order conditions and applying the envelope theorem we get the
following
Corrollary 1 Assume that et is interior, then an optimal contract must satisfy (optimal
variables are denoted with an asterisks)
1
u′(B∗t )
= (1− pi(e∗t , at))
1
u′(B∗t+1)
+ pi(e∗t , at)
1
u′(c∗t+1)
. (2.34)
And, c∗t+1 ≥ B∗t ≥ B∗t+1, which either holds with only strict inequalities or only strict
equalities.
Thus, in the optimal contract unemployment benefits will decrease with duration. This is
a common property see e.g. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997). Moreover, assume log-utility
and apply the envelope condition to equation (2.31) and (2.32). Then we get that
B∗t −B∗t+1 = λICt
pi′(e∗t , at)
1− pi(e∗t , at)
, et ∈ (0, 1), (2.35)
c∗t+1 −Bt = λICt
pi′(e∗t , at)
pi(e∗t , at)
, et ∈ (0, 1). (2.36)
Both the "consumption-punishment" of not finding a job, B∗t −B∗t+1, and the "consumption-
reward" of finding a job, c∗t+1 − Bt, is increasing in the lagrange multiplier of the incentive
compatibility, λIC . λIC is a measure of the cost of not giving proper incentives to exert the
optimal amount of effort, which is increasing in the moral hazard problem of the worker
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and the tax distortion problem. Rearranging equation (2.35) and (2.36) gives the following
condition for when the planner provides incentive through "consumption-punishment" and
through "consumption-reward":
c∗t+1 −Bt ≥ B∗t −B∗t+1 if pi(e∗t , at) ≤
1
2 . (2.37)
This condition states that if the reemployment probability is low the unemployed are
mainly given incentives through reward, that is, the increase in consumption if the worker
finds a job is larger than the decrease in consumption if the worker stays unemployed. The
opposite holds if the reemployment probability is high.
To characterize the optimal contract further, and to compare the optimal contract with
the benchmark model, I use a numerical approach. The estimation of the benchmark model is
explained in detail in the next section.
2.3 Model estimation
In this section I estimate the benchmark model to obtain the search effort exerted by
unemployed US workers, given the existing US labor market policies. Using the estimated
parameters from the benchmark model, I can also compute the optimal contract and thus
compare the effort exerted with the effort which maximizes social welfare under the assumption
of unobservable effort.
The benchmark model is estimated using indirect inference methods, with targets created
using monthly data from Consumer Population Survey (CPS) from 1979 to 2008.14,15 I
generate life cycle profiles for real wages, unemployment rates and weeks of unemployment
duration for three education groups. The education groups considered are: less than high
school "LTHS/1", High School graduates and those with some college "HS and Some College/2",
and College graduates "College+/3". For detailed information about the variables used to
generate the targets, see appendix A. One model period is assumed to be 1/8 of a year (1.5
months). This is set as a compromise between the computational burden and the need of a
high frequency model to be able to capture the true nature of unemployment spells.
The life cycle values for wages and the unemployment rate are generated taking the average
of 14 consecutive cohorts which spans the ages 25-60 with a minimum of 4 observations for
each age group.16 As unemployment duration is not available before 1994, the life cycle values
for average weeks of unemployment are the age-averages in the period 1994-2008. I start the
sample at age 25 to minimize the sample selection bias associated with schooling, as at age
25 most individuals have finished their studies.17 The life cycles are displayed in figure 2.1.
The targets used in the estimation is five year averages of the variables considered, i.e. the
average of 25-29 years, 30-34 years,...., 50-54 years, and finally 55-60 years.
14The data are from CEPR, Center for Economic and Policy Research. 2006. CPS ORG Uniform Extracts,
Version 1.5 . Washington, DC
15I choose to end the sample in 2008, to not let the financial crisis influence the life cycle pattern.
16For more information see appendix A.
17See chapter 1 for a detailed discussion on the sample selection bias associated with schooling.
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Figure 2.1: Life cycle profiles for real wages, the unemployment rate and unemployment
duration.
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Note: Life cycle profiles are obtained from CPS data in the period 1979 to 2008 for real wages and
unemployment rates and from 1994 for the unemployment duration. Real wages and unemployment
rates are obtained from 14 consecutive cohort, where the first cohort is born in 1944. The life cycle for
unemployment duration is constructed by pooling all observations in the period 1994 to2008.
General specifications All individuals enter the labor force at age 25, retire at age 62,
and after 15 years in retirement they exogenously die at age 77.18 I further assume that all
workers have an initial asset level of 40 percent of the initial income, 0.4hi0, and an initial
level of human capital equal to the education average of real wages at age 25.19 I normalize
the initial level of human capital by the average real wage for high school dropouts at age 25.
Preferences All education groups are assumed to have the same preferences. The utility of
consumption is assumed to be CRRA utility function with a risk aversion of 2. The disutility
of effort is given by
18The age of death in the model is motivated by the life expectancy at age 20 for white males in the US,
which is 76.8 years (Source: U.S. National Center for Health Statistics, National Vital Statistics Reports
(NVSR), Deaths: Preliminary Data for 2008, Vol. 59, No. 2, December 2010.)
19The results are similar if I set initial assets to zero. However, as the workers are 25 years old at the
beginning it is reasonable to assume that they have some financial assets to help smoothing consumption
during an unemployment spell.
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v(et) = b
e
1
γ
+1
t
1
γ + 1
, b ≥ 0, γ > 0, (2.38)
where the parameters γ and b are estimated. The annual discount factor β is set at 0.9615,
to match an annual interest rate of 4 percent.
Production technology Human capital is produced according to a simple technology:
Gi(ht, at) = (1− δh)ht +Ai exp(−dat)ht, A, d ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. (2.39)
which is linear in input: the current level of human capital, and where A exp(−dat) is the
age-dependent productivity parameter. If d is positive, human capital accumulation will be
more demanding with age. I assume that A is an education specific parameters, whereas the
effect of age on the production of human capital, given by d, is common across education
groups. As real wages are near constant over the life cycle for workers in the first education
group, see figure 2.1, I assume that they do not produce any human capital when employed,
and set A1 = 0. The annual rate of deprecation of human capital experienced by unemployed
workers, δh, is set to 3 percent for workers with a High School degree, and zero for High School
dropouts. This is in line with micro evidence on the wage costs of labor market intermittency
provided by Kim and Polachek (1994), which find that the annual rate of depreciation is
between 2-5 percent when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues.
The parameters of the production function are identified by the real wage targets.
Separation rate I assume that the separation rate decreases with age according to the
following expression
δt = δ0,i25δ1a−δ1t , i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (2.40)
where δ0,i is the separation rate at age 25 for education group i, and δ1 determines how much
and how fast the separation rate falls over the life cycle. In order to be parsimonious about
the number of parameters to estimate, I assume that δ1 is common to all education groups.
Job finding probability The probability of finding a job is given by
pi(et, at) = 25ξia−ξit et, ξ ≥ 0, i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, ξ2 = ξ3. (2.41)
Again, to be parsimonious I assume that the parameters of the job finding probability function
are the same for the two highest education levels. For a given age, the probability increases
linearly in search effort.20 For a given search effort the job finding probability decreases
with age at a decreasing rate, governed by the size of ξ. This is to capture the increase in
unemployment duration over the life cycle, see figure 2.1, which is particularly pronounced
for the two highest education groups. Moreover, it is in line with micro evidence on the job
finding and the job separation probability over the life cycle: Johnson and Mommaerts (2011)
find that not only does the job separation probability decreases with age, also the job finding
probability decreases with age. Both the parameters of the separation function (δ0,1, δ0,2, δ0,3
20Alternatively, one could assume that disutility of effort is linear and assume an increasing, concave function
for the job-finding probability.
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Table 2.1: Parameters not estimated
Parameter Description Value
σ Risk aversion 2
β Discount factor (annualized) 0.9615
r Interest rate (annualized) 0.04
ρ Unemployment replacement rate 0.5∗
φ Pensions replacement rate 0.44
τ Marginal tax rate 0.15 y ≤ 1.37
0.28 y > 1.37
δh, i = 1 Rate of depreciation of human capital (annualized) 0
δh, i = 2, 3 Rate of depreciation of human capital (annualized) 0.03
nw Periods in labor market 38 ∗ 8
nr Periods retired 15 ∗ 8
Note: *Per period benefits are subject to an upper limit set to 0.6.
and δ1), and of the job finding function (ξ1, ξ2 = ξ3) are identified from the education specific
unemployment rates and the average weeks of unemployment.
Labor market policies As both the UI scheme and the labor income tax policies have
important effects on search effort, it is important to have realistic calibrations of the labor
market policies. Thus, I will not require that the government runs a balanced budget in
the model. I calibrate the tax function to the US tax scheme in place between 1993 to 2001
which covers a large fraction of the periods used for the estimation. The replacement rate
of pre-unemployment earnings has been stable at 50 percent throughout the period, but the
maximum benefits has changed during the period. I calibrate the maximum benefits per
period in the model, using detailed information on maximum benefits by states in the period
1985 to 200021. The upper limit is set based on two measures which I compute for all age
and education groups; the fraction of workers for which the upper bound is binding, and the
deviation between the implied replacement rate and a 50 percent replacement rate. Based on
this I set the maximum benefits equal to half the wage of workers in the group "High School
graduates and some College" at age 25. For more information on the calibration of the policy
functions, see appendix A. The pension replacement rate is set to 0.44, which is the same
values used by Michelacci and Ruffo (2011).22
All parameter values that are not estimated are summarized in table 2.1.
In the estimation I target the percentage deviation between the targets and the simulated
moments. The parameter values obtained from the indirect inference estimation are given
in table 2.2. The curvature of the disutility of search effort, which is measured by γ, is
comparable to the micro estimates for labor effort, which lies in the range of 0− 0.5, see e.g.
21I am grateful to Raj Chetty for providing the data.
22The pension replacement rate is taken from data on male workers according to OECD (2007). This is also
in line with the findings by French and Jones (2012) that Social security replaces about 40% of pre-retirement
earnings.
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Table 2.2: Parameter estimates, targeting age 25-60.
Preferences Human capital Job separation/finding
γ 0.3268 A2 0.0174 δ0,1 0.0746
b 57.9753 A3 0.0237 δ0,2 0.0350
d 0.0326 δ0,3 0.0170
δ1 1.3965
ξ1 0.0809
ξ2,3 0.4757
SSE 0.4090
Note: The targets for the estimation are life cycle profiles for real wages, the
unemployment rate and unemployment duration. The moments from the model
are based on a draw of 10000 individuals. SSE refers to the sum of squared
errors.
MaCurdy (1981) and Altonji (1986) for early contributions, and Ham and Reilly (2002) and
French (2005) for more recent contributions.23 The estimate is also similar to, although lower,
the estimate presented in chapter 1, which finds γ = 0.47 for labor effort in a comparable
model with human capital, but which disregards unemployment. Production of human capital
becomes more difficult with age as d is estimated to be above zero. The job separation rates
and job finding rates are discussed below.
The model fit is fairly good for real wages and the unemployment rate and somewhat
weaker for the duration of unemployment, see figure 2.2. Taken together the model seems to
produce a reasonable fit to the US economy, which makes the quantitative analyses performed
below reasonably informative about the trade-offs and welfare costs faced by the government.
The implied job finding rates and job separation rates are shown in figure 2.3. A typical
reference is the average job finding rates and the job separation rates found by Shimer (2012).
He finds a monthly job separation rate of about 4 percent, and a monthly job finding rate
which fluctuate around 30 percent for the sample period considered here. The job separation
rates seems to be in line with the finding by Shimer, taking into account that the model
period here is 1.5 months, where high educated have a lower job separation probability than
the average rate found by Shimer and low educated have a higher separation rate compared
to the average. The job finding probability is somewhat lower than what Shimer finds.
I now turn to the comparison of the search effort in the benchmark model with the search
effort in the optimal contract.
2.4 Deviations from the optimal contract
In this section I aim at quantifying the importance of the moral hazard problem of unemploy-
ment insurance and the tax distortion problem. As discussed above, one expect the moral
hazard problem to be mild among young medium to high educated workers compared to older
23See Pencavel (1986) for a survey of this literature.
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Figure 2.2: Model fit
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Note: The solid lines are the data moments whereas the dotted lines are the simulated moments. The
moments are 5 year averages, where the data refers to the youngest age, i.e. the value at at age 25 refers
to the average from age 25 to age 29.
workers as they have a strong incentive to search for a job as they forgo the opportunity to
accumulate high return human capital when unemployed. However, the distortionary effects
of labor income taxes may be large also for young workers, as it distorts the accumulation of
human capital. The tax distortions are simply created by the need to finance the UI, and
also other expenses. For the medium and highly educated, the tax distortion problem differs
over the life cycle due to varying labor productivity and as the importance of human capital
accumulation varies. As older workers are highly productive workers, it is very costly to have
them unemployed as they both receive high unemployment benefits and the government forego
important tax income which is needed to finance benefits and pensions. And, as older workers
are high income workers the more progressive the tax system, the larger is tax distortions as
the difference between the private cost of unemployment and the social cost of unemployment
increases. For young unemployed workers the main distortion created by taxes is the distortion
of human capital accumulation: with positive taxes workers net return to human capital
accumulation, which is the relevant measure of the worker, is less than the gross return to
human capital accumulation, which is the relevant measure for the social planner. The wedge
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Figure 2.3: Job separation and job finding probabilities
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(a) Job finding probability
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(b) Job separation probability
Note: Job finding and job separation probabilities implied by the estimated model. The period is 1.5
months.
between the gross and the net return to human capital accumulation obviously widens with
higher taxation and/or more progressive taxation.
To quantify the net importance of the moral hazard problem and the tax distortion
problem, I compare the search effort in the optimal contract with the search effort in the
benchmark economy for different age and education groups. Using the fact that the tax
distortions are zero if taxes are zero, I measure the relative importance of the moral hazard
problem and the tax distortion problem by comparing the deviation from optimal search effort
in a model with and without labor income taxes. Note that the measure of the moral hazard
problem is a relative measure, and only takes into account the "excess" moral hazard problem
relative to the optimal contract. However, under the reasonable assumption of unobservable
search effort, the optimal contract is a natural benchmark.
2.4.1 The optimal contract
I simulate the optimal contract for each education group separately. The expected total
(discounted) cost of the contract offered by the planner to a specific education group is set
equal to the (discounted) expected net cost of the government in the benchmark economy
plus the initial assets of the workers. The initial assets are included as I assume that in the
optimal contract the planner would fully tax any initial assets. The expected net cost in the
benchmark economy, c˜, is given by the expected tax income minus the expected unemployment
benefits and the expected pensions, all discounted to the first period, plus initial assets:
c˜ = −
nw∑
j=1
βj−1Et=1 {τ(hj)}+
nw∑
j=1
βj−1Et=1 {b(hj)}+
nr∑
j=nw+1
βj−nw−1Et=1 {τ(pihtw)}+ k0.
(2.42)
The total net costs are not restricted to be zero for each education group for two reasons;
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First, as the total level of income taxes, and its progressivity, matters for the wedge between
the private return and the social return to human capital accumulation, it is important to
have a realistic tax function in the benchmark model. Second, I want to include some implicit
redistribution between education groups, where highly educated workers run a larger life-time
budget surplus compared to low educated. For simplicity, I assume that any budget surplus is
simply thrown away and do not provide any utility.
The promised life-time utility for a worker with education level i, vs,i, is found by solving
the following equation
Cs(1, h1,i, vs,i) = c˜. (2.43)
Note that when I compare the model with and without taxes, I also adjust the optimal
contract according to the net budget associated with each case. For the other labor market
polices I analyze, I simply adjust the tax rates to ensure that the government runs the same
education specific deficit/surplus as the benchmark model with progressive taxation.
2.4.2 The benchmark economy relative to the optimal contract
The next step is to compare the search effort in the benchmark model with the search effort
in the optimal contract. And, measure the relative importance of the moral hazard problem
and the tax distortion problem. I pursue in two steps: First, I simulate the two models with
the same initial conditions and compare each workers search effort in the two models.24 I
assume the following initial conditions: all workers are initially unemployed, have an initial
education specific human capital as specified in section 3, and have asset holding equal to
one month of labor income.25 Second, to assess the importance of the moral hazard problem
and the tax distortion problem I simulate the models assuming that there are no income
taxes, as tax distortions are zero if taxes are zero. By comparing the deviation from optimal
search effort with and without taxes, I measure the severeness of the moral hazard problem
versus the tax distortion problem. One could also solve the model with non-distortionary
taxes rather than assuming that there are no taxes. However, it is nontrivial to solve for a set
of non-distortionary taxes; any tax which affects the utility of consumption for unemployed
and employed differently will distort search effort. This is easily seen from the first order
condition with respect to search effort:
g′(et) = βpi′(et, at)
[
V et+1(·)− V ut+1(·)
]
,
24In order to not measure the deviation of search effort due to previous deviations, I assume that the job
finding rate until age t in the benchmark model is given by the optimal contract, so that the accumulation of
human capital (an assets) are the same in both models. I then compare search effort at time t.
25The inital asset holdings are set to minimize the distortions of search effort due to lack of assets to smooth
consumption at young ages. Although this is indeed an important distortion, as discussed by e.g. Chetty
(2008), it is not the focus of the paper and complicates the discussion of the relative importance between the
moral hazard problem and the tax distortion problem.
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which shows that for a tax to be non-distortionary it cannot affect the difference between the
future value of being employed, V et+1(·), and the future value of being unemployed, V ut+1(·).
Thus, as consumption differs across the two states, and this difference varies with age and
education, taxes need to account for all these differences in order to be non-distortionary.
Therefore, I limit the analysis to the case of no taxes. Note that there will still be taxes in the
optimal contract, as the possibility of optimally setting reemployment taxes improves welfare
in the constrained best, see e.g. Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997).26 As emphasized above, the
moral hazard problem in the benchmark model is then measured relative to the moral hazard
problem in the optimal contract, and is a measure of excess moral hazard.
In this section I set as benchmark an unemployment policy with 50 percent replacement
rate irrespective of the workers income level, to enhance comparison across groups. The case
with a maximum per period benefit, as assumed above, is studied below. The benchmark
labor income tax is however as specified above, and features a degree of progressivity which is
calibrated to match the US policy.
The deviations from optimal search effort over the life cycle for the three education groups
are shown in figure 2.4. There are two main findings obtained from the two figures; First,
the deviation from optimal search effort across age and education is inversely related to the
return to human capital accumulation; whereas the return to human capital accumulation
decreases with age and increases with education, the deviation from optimal search effort
increases with age and decreases with education. For the benchmark policy, the deviation
is on average 21 percent, 11.5 percent and 9.9 percent over the life cycle for workers with
’LTHS’, HS-Some college” and ’College +’, respectively. Moreover, the deviation from the
optimal contract is increasing over the life cycle for the two highest education groups, and
is about constant over the life cycle for the low educated. The increase is due to both an
increase in the moral hazard problem and in the tax distortion problem.
Second, by comparing the deviation with and without taxes one can assess the relative
importance of the moral hazard problem versus the tax distortion problem. The deviations
from the optimal contract is considerably smaller when only including the moral hazard
problem. For young workers with medium and high education, the moral hazard problem is
indeed very small and for high educated workers the precautionary motive seems to makes
workers exert more effort than the optimal contract. However, to conclude that social costs of
generous UI benefits to young workers are modest, based only on the modest moral hazard
costs, would lead policy makers to considerably underestimate the true costs. For young
workers with high education the moral hazard problem accounts for virtually none of the total
deviation and it increases to about 25 percent for older workers, see lower right panel of figure
2.4.27 For workers with medium education the moral hazard problem accounts for 10− 20
26The reemployment tax is however less efficient than in Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), as argued by
Sopraseuth et al. (2007). The reason is due to the short tax horizon in a life cycle model compared to an
infinite horizon model. This is particularly true for older workers.
27To ensure a meaningful comparison for workers with a College degree, the deviation from optimal effort is
reduced by a fixed amount to ensure that the deviation is never positive. However, the importance of moral
hazard is actually negative in this region. But due to values very close to zero in the denominator, the negative
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percent for young workers and increases to close to 50 percent for older workers. For workers
with low education and a flat wage profile, both the tax distortion problem and the moral
hazard problem are constant over the life cycle, and the moral hazard problem dominates the
costs by accounting for close to 70 percent of the social costs of unemployment benefits to
this group.
Figure 2.4: Deviation from the search effort in the optimal contract by education groups, in
percent
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Note: The lines refers to different tax policies in the model, where the benchmark is the progressive tax
scheme.
*For college graduates, the relative importance of moral hazard has been modified to address the positive
deviation with zero taxes. For more information see the text.
In the analysis above, the labor income tax was progressive and the government did not
run a balanced budget, neither for each education group nor for the economy as a whole.
This was motivated by the fact that labor income taxes in the US are progressive, and they
are used to finance more than just pensions and unemployment benefits. However, in the
importance of moral hazard becomes very large. However, this will unfortunately yield a value of zero moral
hazard costs for the year with the maximum positive deviation in the economy with no taxes.
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literature it is common to perform the same analysis assuming that the government runs a
balanced budget and that taxes are linear. When comparing a progressive and linear tax, I
adjust the linear tax so that they generate the same net tax revenues as the progressive tax.
When assuming that the government runs a balanced budget per education group the linear
tax is adjusted accordingly. For the low educated this does not matter much as they face
linear taxes under the benchmark tax policy and almost runs a balanced budget, see upper
left panel of figure 2.5. For the medium and high educated the deviation from optimal search
effort decreases substantially with respect to the benchmark case; when workers face a linear
tax and the government runs a balanced budget the average deviation falls from 11.5 to 7.5
percent for ’HS-Some College’, and from 9.9 to 4 percent for College graduates. Moreover,
among young workers with a College degree the deviation is close to zero. Thus, both the
assumption of a linear tax and a balanced budget substantially reduces the deviation from
the optimal search effort.
Figure 2.5: The effects of a linear tax and a balanced budget on the deviation from optimal
search effort, in percent
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The importance of moral hazard in the cases with a linear tax and a balanced budget is
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somewhat higher for the two top education groups, whereas it is almost unchanged for the
low educated, see figure 2.6. However, it is still the case that the main social costs associated
with unemployment insurance is not the moral hazard problem but distortions created by
labor income taxes needed to finance the UI. Thus, even the taxes needed to finance only the
unemployment benefits induces tax distortions which are so large that they account for most
of the social costs of UI provision for the two highest education groups.
Figure 2.6: The importance of moral hazard*, in percent
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(a) Linear tax
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*For college graduates, the relative importance of moral hazard has been modified to address the positive
deviation with zero taxes. For more information see the text.
Finally, I consider the case where unemployment benefits are subject to a cap, that is, for
income above a given threshold the replacement rate is regressive. In the calibration above the
maximum level is set so that it starts binding at age 25 for the two highest education groups,
but never binds for the low educated. For the middle education group the replacement rate
decreases from 50 percent for young workers to 40 percent for older workers, whereas for the
high educated it decreases from about 45 percent for young to 25 percent for older workers.
Regressive benefits decreases the deviation from optimal search effort for older workers, as
they face a less generous UI system, see figure 2.7. For College graduates the search incentives
created by the regressive benefits are so strong that the deviation from the optimal search
effort becomes decreasing in age, and is very close to the optimal level for old workers.
The welfare gains, measured in consumption equivalents, W1, of implementing the optimal
contract differs substantially between education groups, see table 2.3. The low educated has
the highest welfare gains of implementing the optimal contract, corresponding to about one
percent increase in consumption. However, for the two highest education groups the welfare
gains are modest, corresponding to a roughly a 1/3 of a percent increase in consumption for
the medium educated and close to 1/5 of a percent increase for the high educated. The welfare
gains are considerably smaller than what e.g. Michelacci and Ruffo (2011) find. But, this is
as expected as they assume a tight borrowing constraint which limits the workers ability to
optimally smooth consumption over the life cycle.
58 CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL LABOR MARKET POLICIES
Figure 2.7: Effects of regressive benefits on the deviation from the optimal search effort, in
percent
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The welfare gains are modest, as lower search effort in the benchmark models yields sizable
welfare gains compared to the optimal contract. The consumption increase needed to equalize
the life time utility of consumption, W2, however, is substantially larger. For the model with
labor market policies closest to the US, which has progressive taxes and a maximum limit, the
consumption gains needed to equalize the life time utility of consumption are at 2.81 percent,
1.2 percent and 0.58 percent for workers with low, medium and high education, respectively.
Table 2.3: Welfare losses
LTHS HS-Some College College+
Benchmark W1
W2
1.08
(2.81)
0.34
(1.28)
0.18
(0.78)
Linear tax W1
W2
1.08
(2.81)
0.36
(1.13)
0.22
(0.62)
Maximum benefits W1
W2
1.08
(2.81)
0.34
(1.20)
0.17
(0.58)
Note: W1 refers to the consumption gain needed to equalize life time utility with
the optimal contract. W2 refers to the consumption gain needed to equalize the
life time utility of consumption only.
This section offers some key lessons when assessing the deviations from optimal search
effort. First, there is a significant degree of heterogeneity across age and education groups
due to different returns to human capital accumulation. Second, social costs associated with
moral hazard problems are not the main problem with unemployment insurance, rather, it is
2.5. THE OPTIMAL CONTRACT 59
the tax distortion problem caused by the need to finance the UI through labor income taxes
that accounts from the main costs of unemployment insurance. Third, it is important to
consider the total tax burden of employed workers when one wants to assess the deviation
between the search effort exerted and the optimal level. And, finally, assumptions about labor
market policies matters. Both the degree of progressivity in taxes and the regressivity. of
benefits (due to maximum per period benefits) affects the search effort of workers and the
deviation from the optimal contract; More progressive taxes increases the deviation whereas
more regressive benefits decreases the deviation.
2.5 The optimal contract
As shown above, search effort is substantially below what the optimal contract would require,
but the degree to which search effort deviates varies between age and education groups. In
this section I discuss the optimal contracts given to each education group in some more detail.
In particular, I focus on the differences across age and education groups, which is due to
different returns to human capital accumulation. However, I will leave a discussion of possible
decentralizations to future research.
The average tax rate and replacement rate over the life cycle for the three education groups
are shown in figure 2.8. Whereas the age-average of the tax rate and the replacement rate are
constant over the life cycle for workers with education less than High School, replacement
rates decreases with age and tax rates increases with age for the College graduates. The
middle education group has more of a hump-shape on both tax rates and replacement rates.
The net replacement rate however, which is benefits over income net of taxes, Bh−T , is highest
for the low educated and decreasing in education and in age. This reflects the need to provide
workers with a strong career effect with sufficient incentives to search for a job to accumulate
high return human capital.
The profiles for tax rates and the gross replacement rate for College graduates are similar to
the ones found in Michelacci and Ruffo (2011). They found that implementing age-dependent
taxes and benefits, where replacement rates decrease with age and tax rates increase, would
yield significant welfare improvements in the US. The results obtained here indicates that
such a labor market policy may not be optimal for the lowest education groups. Moreover,
the educational differences in the optimal taxes and transfers indicate that policies which do
not take educational differences in the return to human capital accumulation into account
may be quite inefficient.
Figure 2.9 shows how the optimal contract changes with unemployment duration for 4
age groups. For all age and education groups the replacement rate falls with duration and
the re-employment tax increases with duration, see the first and second row. The fall in
replacement rates and the increase in tax rates are larger for higher educated workers. For the
two highest education groups the magnitude of the fall in replacement rates and the increase
in tax rates over the duration both declines with age, whereas the opposite is true for the low
educated. For all education groups the utility gain of finding a job increases with age and
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Figure 2.8: Policies in the optimal contract, age and education averages
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with duration, see the last row. However, as discussed above, the higher is the job finding
rate the more is the utility gain driven by punishment and the lower is the job finding rate
the more important is reward.
The optimal contracts show a lot of similarities across education groups, but there are
also some important differences. Any implementation of the optimal contract need to take
these educational differences into account.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper I show that it is important to take into account heterogeneous returns to human
capital accumulation when analyzing both the degree to which search effort deviates from
the socially optimal level, and the reason behind the deviation. In particular, I analyze the
effects of heterogeneous returns to human capital on the moral hazard problem of unemployed
workers and on the distortionary effects of labor income taxes. Under the assumption that the
government do not have access to lump-sum taxation, labor income taxes distorts search effort
by lowering after-tax re-employment wages, but importantly, taxes also lowers the return
to human capital accumulation. The latter is important as contemporaneous distortions of
search effort has long lasting effects on future productivity and wages through both a larger
depreciation and reduced accumulation of human capital.
To analyze the importance of both the moral hazard problem and the tax distortion
problem, I develop a life cycle model featuring heterogeneous human capital accumulation
across age and education, and costly search effort. I estimate the model using indirect inference
methods, and match the model to the US economy both in terms of key variables and labor
market policies. By comparing the search effort exerted in the estimated model with the effort
specified in an optimal contract offered by the government who do not observe the search
effort exerted, I obtain a measure of the deviation of search effort from the (constrained)
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optimal level. Moreover, as the tax distortion problem is due to positive taxation, I isolate
the importance of (excess) moral hazard by comparing the optimal contract with the search
effort exerted by workers who face zero income taxes.
The three main findings of this paper are: (i) the main social costs associated with today’s
US unemployment insurance are not due to moral hazard problems, but are due to the
distortionary effects of labor income taxes needed to finance the insurance. For young workers
the moral hazard problem accounts for less than 20 percent for workers with High School
and some College, and close to zero percent for College graduates. For older workers, the
moral hazard problem accounts for about 25 percent and 45-50 percent for workers with High
School and some College and College graduates, respectively. For workers with less than High
School, the moral hazard problem is constant at 70 percent.
(ii) The magnitude of the moral hazard problem and the tax distortion problem, differs
substantially over the life cycle and across education groups. I find that the deviation of search
effort is negatively related to the return to human capital accumulation. That is, the deviation
is increasing in age and decreasing in education. And, (iii) the degree of tax progressiveness
and benefit regressiveness has important effects on the deviation of search effort from the
optimal level. More progressive taxes increases the deviation from optimal search effort, and
more so for young workers. The effect of progressive taxes are more important for younger
workers as more progressive taxes reduces the returns to human capital accumulation. More
regressive benefits, through e.g. lower maximum benefits, has the opposite effect: more
progressive benefits decreases the deviation from optimal search effort, and more so for older
workers. The effect of regressive benefits are strongest for older workers as they have higher
wages and thus obtain lower effective replacement rates.
Finally, I also show that the optimal contract offered to each education group differs in an
important way: whereas the average replacement rate is falling with age and the average tax
rate is increasing in age for the two highest education groups, the average replacement rate
and tax rate is constant across age for the low educated group. This reflects the wage patterns
of the education groups and the consumption smoothing motive of the planner. Although I do
not make any attempt on proposing a set of policies which could bring the US welfare closer
to the constrained best, I do believe that such a policy need to take both age and educational
differences into account.
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Appendix
A Moments
The targets for the indirect inference estimation are created using monthly CPS data from
1979 to 2008 on real wages, unemployment rates and the duration of unemployment.28,29 I
choose to end the sample in 2008 to avoid the recent financial crisis to influence the later
part of the life cycle measure. I use data on worker between 25 and 60 years with a well
defined entries for labor force participation and education level. I exclude the following set of
workers (the data codes are in parentheses): self employed (selfemp=1), workers with positive
business income (selfinc=1), students (student=1 and studpt==1), worker who work less
than 35 hours due to illness (why3594=5 and why2579=10), and employed workers with zero
income (rw=0 & empl=1).
B Labor market policies
The tax function and the UI policy are calibrated to match the US system in the estimation
period, 1979-2008, as well as possible. The tax function is calibrated using the tax scheme
in place from 1994 to 2000 (OBRA93). For average to lower income earner, the OBRA93
tax scheme match well already from 1987, with a stable income tax at 15% for the first tax
bracket.
When calibrating the tax function to match labor income levels in the model, I use annual
income data from CPS30 in the year 2000 and the tax ranges for year 2000. As the changes
in income-ranges for the tax brackets are only adjusted for inflation between 1994-2000, the
benchmark-year should not matter. I use the income-ranges for the "head of household"
specification, and compute the average labor income tax rate paid by all age-education groups
in year 2000. I then choose the tax ranges in the model which provides the best fit between the
average labor income tax in the year 2000 data and the average tax rate paid by the workers
with an income equal to the estimation targets specified above. The resulting marginal tax
function, shown for the relevant income levels, is
taxt =
0.15 if y < 1.37
0.28 if 1.37 ≤ y ≤ 3.5 ,
where y is the labor income. The average tax rate in the data and in the model is shown in
figure B.1. This also match very well the marginal income tax rate for the highest and lowest
education groups, which in the period from 1987 to 2008 had a marginal tax rate of 15% and
28%, respectively.31
28The data are from CEPR, Center for Economic and Policy Research. 2006. CPS ORG Uniform Extracts,
Version 1.5 . Washington, DC
29The data on unemployment duration is only available from 1994.
30Data from: Miriam King, Steven Ruggles, J. Trent Alexander, Sarah Flood, Katie Genadek, Matthew B.
Schroeder, Brandon Trampe, and Rebecca Vick. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series, Current Population
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Figure B.1: The calibrated tax rate and US tax rates in year 2000
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Note: Solid lines is the average tax rate for the year 2000 using CPS data on income and the official tax
brackets. The dotted lines are the calibrated average tax rate paid by workers with an income equal to the
sample average of income, which is the calibration target used for the model computed from CPS data.
The UI policy is a two parameter function specifying the replacement rate and an upper
bound on per period benefits. The replacement rate is set to 0.5, which is common in the
literature, see e.g. Chetty (2008). To calibrate the upper bound on benefits I use maximum
weekly benefits by states from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) over
the period 1985 to 2000.32, and individual data on weekly income from the CPS in the
same period. Using state specific benefit levels, I take into account differences in state level
wages which may be important. Contrary to above, I include all cohorts in the sample to
obtain information on all ages. However, the restriction on the sample apart from the cohort
restrictions are the same as above.
I set the upper limit on benefits based on two measure: the share of workers where the
upper limit on benefits is binding, that is if weekly income exceeds two times the maximum
weekly benefits. And, the mean income relative to twice the maximum benefits. Both measures
are computed for all ages and three education levels. The two measures are shown in figure
B.2. For workers with less than High School, the share of workers with a binding benefit
restriction is maximum 40 percent, and the average income is below the maximum benefit for
all ages. For workers with a High School degree and some College, the share of workers with
a binding restriction is above 50 percent from the age 28 an onwards, and the average income
is above the maximum benefits for the same age interval. For College graduates, the share
of workers with a binding restriction is close to 100 percent for most ages, and the average
income is always above the maximum benefits. Based on this, I set the upper limit on the
benefits equal to 50 percent of the income level for workers with a High School degree at age
25. Thus, for the two highest education groups the upper limit on benefits will be binding for
Survey: Version 3.0., Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2010.
31I compute the marginal tax rate as the marginal rate paid on the last dollar of the annual labor earning,
not taking any transfers into account. More specifically, the marginal tax rate is obtained using the Stata
built-in command egen mtr.
32I thank Raj Chetty for making the dataset and STATA codes available.
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all ages, whereas it will never be binding for the low educated.
Figure B.2: Share of workers for which the upper limit on benefits are binding, and mean
income relative to the maximum benefits
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(a) Share of workers with a binding benefit restric-
tion.
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weekly benefits.
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3 Household Risk, Labor Supply and Pre-
cautionary Wealth Accumulation
3.1 Introduction
When it comes to income fluctuations and employment risk the individual relies to a
large extent on labor supply and precautionary savings for insurance. The main reasons are
that private insurance markets do not exist, that individuals are credit constrained, and that
the insurance coverage provided by governments in case of loss of employment is limited.1
Another potential source of income insurance is the marriage itself through income pooling
and spousal labor supply. Lundberg (1985) investigated the insurance potential of the latter
channel in what she called the "added worker effect", but spousal labor supply as income
insurance has been neglected in the literature on income risk and savings until recently.2
Blundell et al. (2012) and Ortigueira and Siassi (2013) are two contributions highlighting the
potential importance of intra-household risk-sharing through spousal labor supply.
This paper takes a first step towards a better understanding of the nature of income risk
that different households face by studying the relation between co-movement of income shocks
and precautionary asset holdings. In particular, we want to assess whether households perceive
spousal labor supply as a source of income insurance, and how this insurance mechanism vary
with the co-movement of income shocks. The idea is that if there is income pooling within
the household and labor supply is inelastic, all that matters for the precautionary savings
is the variance of total income.3 However, if households perceive spousal labor supply as
a source of insurance, it is evident that this mechanism should work better the lower the
This chapter is joint work with Andreas Fagereng and Maria Gustafsson. The chapter has benefitted from
discussions and useful suggestions from Christopher Carroll. I thank Statistics Norway for their hospitality
during the work on this project.
1Unemployment insurance does not cover 100 percent of the income and there is usually a ceiling. Evidence
on credit constrained households is provided by, for example, Jappelli et al. (1998), and by Crossley and Low
(2012) for job losers in particular.
2The initial literature on the added worker effect focused on changes in labor supply along the extensive
margin, see e.g. Lundberg (1985). The focus of this paper is on changes in labor supply along the intensive
margin. However, we choose to label this effect the added worker-effect, as more recent literature has also used
this terminology regarding the intensive margin, see e.g Blundell et al. (2012).
3Note that the analysis only hinges on the assumption of a minimum of income pooling. That is, that the
households share a strictly positive fraction of their labor income.
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co-movement in shocks to the spousal incomes. Thus, if the household is using labor supply to
smooth shocks we should see that the correlation of shocks to the spouses’ wages matters for
precautionary wealth accumulation independent of the variance. This prediction can be tested
empirically and in order to do so we use administrative data from Norway, which provides
detailed information on household income, financial wealth and a rich set of control variables
while minimizing the risk of measurement error.
To assess the importance of household insurance through spousal labor supply, we proceed
in two steps. First, we first estimate the variance and the correlation of shocks to the income
of individuals within a household. The variance and correlation of household income shocks
are obtained by removing predictable changes in income and computing the variance and
correlation of the residuals. More specifically, we use a rolling windows approach to estimate
the parameters, which allows for the variance and the correlation to vary over time for a given
household. We find that households in which both spouses have the same education level or
are working in the same industry have a higher correlation of income shocks than couples who
have different education levels and work in different industries. This is also what we would
expect if assortative matching on education and industry could matter for the co-movement
of shocks.
Second, we test whether households with stronger co-movement of income shocks, for
a given variance, holds larger precautionary buffers. In particular, we regress different
specifications of financial wealth on the variance and correlation of income shocks as well as on
other relevant household characteristics. In the analysis we attempt to deal with measurement
error in the variance and correlation estimates by using the variance in different industry
combinations of the individuals in a household over time as instruments. In addition, we also
attempt to control for time-invariant, unobserved differences between the households that
might bias the coefficient estimates, using the fixed effects estimator. This is possible since
we have obtained several estimates of the variance and the correlation for each household.
The empirical results strongly indicate that intra-household insurance through labor supply
is important. Our preferred estimator - the instrumental variables-fixed effects estimator
- indicates that the correlation of income shocks has an important positive effect on the
precautionary savings of the household, independent of the variance of total income. More
specifically, we find that an increase from the lowest to the highest correlation documented in
our sample would predict a median increase in financial assets of 97,144 NOK, or equivalently
16 percent of average yearly disposable income.
In our study the precautionary motive for saving is an important point of departure for the
analysis. By now there are several empirical studies testing the strength of the precautionary
motive by relating measures of income uncertainty to savings and asset holdings. Of these,
several studies find that there is a positive relation between income risk and wealth, although
the importance of the precautionary motive varies between studies.4,5 Our analysis shows
4See e.g. Guiso et al. (1992); Carroll and Samwick (1997); Kazarosian (1997); Lusardi (1998);Carroll et al.
(2003); Alan (2006); and Hurst et al. (2006)
5See Browning and Lusardi (1996) for a review of the earlier literature on savings choices and Meghir and
Pistaferri (2011) for a summary of the more recent literature.
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evidence in favor of the precautionary savings hypothesis as our measure of income variance
has a strong positive effect on asset holdings. There are few studies investigating the insurance
provided through individual labor supply, and even fewer studies considering the insurance
provided by family members. Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981) is one of the first studies to look
at insurance through family members, but they do not consider labor income. Attanasio
et al. (2005) model a two-person household to investigate the response of female labor force
participation to idiosyncratic risks within the family while male participation is exogenous. In
an attempt to study the welfare implications of a changing U.S. wage structure, Heathcote et al.
(2010) use a model in which both female and male labor supply is endogenous. Ortigueira and
Siassi (2013) attempt to quantify the importance of intra-household risk-sharing, calibrating
a model with endogenous labor supply of both spouses. Their findings indicate that this
risk-sharing is important, especially for households with little wealth. Blundell et al. (2012)
find that, when they add family labor supply to assets and taxes, there is little evidence of
any other insurance.
Empirical tests of the importance of spousal labor supply for income insurance have
focused on the extensive margin. In particular these studies look at whether married women
tend to enter the labor market in response to unemployment of their husband and find small,
positive effects (see e.g. Lundberg (1985), Cullen and Gruber (2000), and Juhn and Potter
(2007)). Boca et al. (2000) do not find that the likelihood of wife employment increases with
unemployment of the husband on average. However, in households where wife employment
is likely to be "more accepted" they do find a positive effect. Stephens (2002) investigates
the response of wives’ work effort, including adjustments on the intensive margin. They
find small increases in wives’ labor supply prior to displacement and larger responses post
displacement. Indirect evidence of the importance of spousal labor supply is provided by
Browning and Crossley (2001) who find that the expenditure response to an increase in the
replacement rate of unemployment insurance is higher for individuals whose spouse was not
employed, indicating that spousal income is important for consumption smoothing during an
unemployment spell. Similarly, findings by Lusardi (1998) indicate that the precautionary
savings motive seems stronger for households with only one earner. On their part, Juhn and
Potter (2007) argue that the value of marriage as insurance is likely to have decreased over
time due to increased female labor force participation and a more positive co-movement of
spouses’ employment.
This paper contributes to the literature on insurance through spousal labor supply by
considering whether households provide insurance along the intensive margin. The answer
to this question has important policy implications. In a companion paper to this Fagereng
et al. (2014) we show that the ability of using this channel most likely vary in the population.
If spousal labor supply is an important insurance channel for households, but the ability
of using it differs among households, it means that some households are to a larger extent
exposed non-insurable labor market risk than others. If this risk differs between education
and income groups, for example, the policy implications could be different depending on what
part of the economy that is hit by a income shock. Furthermore, that households face different
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insurance possibilities due to different degrees of income correlation could be important to
take into account when evaluating the effect of progressive income taxation and unemployment
insurance. Moreover, if labor supply does provide insurance against shocks to labor income,
we face the important question of to what extent unemployment insurance may crowd out
labor supply, as emphasized by Cullen and Gruber (2000), Engen and Gruber (2001), and
Ortigueira and Siassi (2013).
Finally, the findings of this paper points the importance of intra-household risk-sharing
through labor supply for Norway, a country where the female labor force participation is high
and the ability to adjust labor supply may be hampered by labor regulations. Thus we should
expect that the importance of labor supply as insurance should be even higher in a country
such as the US.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The following section presents the institutional
setting and the data, Section 3 contains the estimation of income variance and correlation.
Section 4 offers an empirical test of the importance of spousal labor supply for insurance, and
Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Institutional setting and data
3.2.1 Institutional setting
In this section we will provide an overview of institutional details of relevance for our study,
which will contribute to a better understanding of how the results for Norway may compare
to other countries. More specifically we will look closer at the generosity of unemployment
insurance and measures of labor market flexibility.
Unemployment insurance. Even if shocks to employment are not the focus of this paper,
unemployment constitutes an important part of the income risk that the individual faces. If
the state-provided unemployment insurance is a feasible alternative to household income, the
importance of all insurance channels, including spousal labor supply, decreases.
Norway is among the OECD countries with the most generous welfare system and partici-
pation in welfare programs is compulsory for all residents. The most important services for
adults include unemployment insurance (UI), sick money and disability pensions. When it
comes to UI, there is a minimum income requirement in order to be eligible. However, this
level is low by Norwegian standards and in practice all full-time employees will meet this
requirement. For 2007, the amount was 100,000 Norske kroner (NOK), or around 16,000 US
dollar. Workers who become unemployed are entitled to around 62 percent of their earnings in
the calendar year before job loss up to a ceiling.6 The ceiling is always six times "grunnbeløpet"
(the amount used as a basis to calculate social insurance payments).7 Among the individuals
6As pointed out by Browning and Crossley (2001), a ceiling on the insurable income of an individual implies
that high-income individuals will experience a larger shock to income in case of unemployment than low-income
individuals as their UI replacement rate is effectively lower.
7"Grunnbeløpet" changes every year to account for changes in inflation.
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in our sample in year 2010, around two thirds of the individuals earn more than the ceiling.
The individual can receive UI for a maximum of 2 years.8 When the UI expires the individual
is entitled to means-tested social assistance to cover basic needs, without maximum duration.9
To provide a picture of the generosity of the Norwegian benefits in comparison to other
countries we use calculations of benefit generosity made by the OECD.10 Their measure
of gross replacement rates compares unemployment benefits received when not working to
wages earned when employed and is provided for the years 2001 to 2011.11 According to this
measure, Norway had the highest benefit ratio of the 29 countries included in 2001 at 56
percent, followed by Denmark at 54 percent. Between 2001 and 2011, the ratio decreased and
the average ratio for Norway over the whole period is 47, which is the second highest average
after Denmark’s 50 percent. These numbers can be compared to 11 percent for the UK and
13 percent for the US. The lowest period average is that of the Czech Republic at 6 percent.
OECD also provides a similar measure12 that is calculated for uneven years between 1975
and 2005, but may be less comparable across countries. This measure indicates that the
average Norwegian replacement rate was relatively low between 1961 and 1975 (5 percent),
compared to most other countries for which there is data.13 However, it increased drastically
between 1975 and 1977 from 8 to 21 percent. In 1981 Norway placed itself among the OECD
countries with a relatively generous insurance. This means that the importance of individual
and family insurance may have decreased more over time for a Norwegian than for individuals
in other countries, as for example Denmark.
Labor market flexibility. The degree of labor market flexibility may be important for
the impact of income shocks. A less rigid labor market in terms of employment protection
legislation or a loser legislation when it comes to temporary work, may in itself cause greater
insecurity regarding future income for those who work. On the other hand, it may make it
easier to find a new job if exposed to a negative employment shock, as well as to facilitate for
the partner to find a job in case of a negative shock to the partner’s income.
In order to see how Norway compares to other countries on these factors, we use data and
studies from the OECD. OECD has a much cited measure of the strictness of the employment
protection legislation (EPL) of countries. The measure is a summary index taking into account
8Unemployed workers above the age of 64 can receive the payments until they retire at 67.
9The worker could also receive sick money or disability pensions, given that a medical doctor certifies that
he or she cannot work, or is permanently disabled. The maximum duration of sick money is one year and is
paid at a rate of 100 percent up to the same ceiling as for UI. The replacement rate of the disability insurance
is around 67 percent up the same ceiling as for UI.
10See Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs. Benefits and Wages: Statistics.
11More specifically, the benefits includes unemployment insurance and unemployment assistance benefits
and the individual is the unit of analysis. The measure represents the average of the gross unemployment
benefit replacement rates for two earnings levels (average earnings and two thirds of average earnings, for three
different durations of an unemployment spell, and for three family and income situations (single, married with
dependent spouse, and married with spouse in work). For more details, see Martin (1996).
12It sometimes includes also social assistance.
13This can be compared to for example Denmark (27), Belgium (40) and the UK (25) during the same
period.
74 CHAPTER 3. HOUSEHOLD RISK
procedures and costs involved in dismissing workers. For the measure of protection of regular
workers against individual and collective dismissals in 2013, Norway is at the OECD average
of 2.9 out of 5. New Zealand, the US, Canada and the UK occupy the four lowest places in
the ranking, while France, Netherlands, Belgium and Germany are at the top.14
When it comes to the use of permanent contracts, the share of dependent workers on
permanent contracts rather than on temporary in Norway is on average 92.5 between 1996
and 2012. The OECD average during the same time period is 90.6 percent and for the UK
95.1.15 In regards to the regulation surrounding temporary contracts, Norway ranks the 4th
highest of the OECD countries in terms of strictness of the regulation, while UK, US and
Canada hold the three bottom positions.
The extent to which it is possible to work part time is another factor likely to contribute
to the flexibility of changing work hours. According to the OECD Full-time/Part-time
Employment Database, the share of part-time of total employment in Norway is quite high
compared to other OECD countries.16 In 1983 it was 29.6 percent, compared to 24.8 for
Sweden, and 21.2 for the Netherlands. UK had 19.0 and the US 18.4. Italy had the lowest
share in this year at 4.6. The share in part-time in Norway has not followed the increasing
trend seen in most other OECD countries and in 2010 it was 26.7, which is still among the
highest. The only countries with higher values are Australia (29.8), Netherlands (35.2) and
Mexico (27.1).17
To summarize, Norway seems to be a country with fairly rigid labor markets and generous
unemployment insurance as compared to many other countries.
3.2.2 Data description
The data that we use is administrative data from the Norwegian tax registers between the
years 1985 and 2010.18 The dataset covers every individual in Norway and allows us to track
the income of the individuals for every year since 1985.19 Moreover, from 1993 we are able to
merge this information with the financial wealth of the households through a unique personal
identifier available in all registers in Norway. A couple (or a household in this context) is
identified as two individuals who are married, or as two individuals who live together with
common children. We can observe the latter since 1991. Unfortunately it is not possible to
identify unmarried but cohabiting couples without children.
14OECD Employment Outlook (2013).
15Source OECD Labor Force Statistics. The period is from 1996 because before that data for Norway was
missing. For the US, there is a lot of years missing in general.
16Note that the definitions of part-time varies a lot among countries. This is not of importance here however,
as we want to provide a view of the individuals’ possibility of changing their work hours within the national
context.
17Even though women are contributing to most of the part-time work, also the share of males working
part-time in Norway has been relatively high throughout the period, as compared to other OECD countries.
18For more information on the Norwegian administrative data in general, see Røed and Raaum (2003) and
for more information on the wealth data in particular, see Fagereng et al. (2013).
19Income information is available from an earlier point in time, but financial information is only available
from 1993. Why we chose 1985 will become clear with the presentation of the estimation approach.
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In order to estimate the variance and the correlation of job related income risk in a
household we use the labor income of each individual. Labor income includes wage income
and work-related transfers, such as unemployment and sickness benefits, as well as maternity
leave payments. The disposable income of the individuals, i.e. the income net of taxes, is
calculated for each household using the relevant tax rates for each year. In our analysis of
precautionary wealth holdings the theoretically correct measure is correlation and variance of
wage shocks rather than of income. Unfortunately the dataset does not contain information
on labor supply for all years such that we can calculate the wages. However, even if the labor
supply reacts to shocks, it may not be to the extent that the ordering of households in the
income correlation and wage correlation distribution changes. In Fagereng et al. (2014) we
show that for the part of the dataset for which we have information on contractual hours
there are some differences in the estimated wage and income correlations, but they are not
very big. If anything, the main difference seems to be at younger ages.
For the main analysis we are interested in the relation between the variance and correlation
of income risk and precautionary wealth holdings of the household (see Section 4). For the
main analysis we use the financial wealth of the household as our measure of precautionary
wealth holdings.20 The household’s financial wealth is defined as the sum of the financial assets
of the individuals in the household, where financial assets consist of direct stock holdings,
stock holdings through mutual funds, bank deposits and bond holdings. Some households
have savings in pension plans, but as these plans are only payable at the age of retirement,
the major part of the households in our sample will not be able to draw on these assets in
times of lower income (see sample restrictions below).
One can argue that financial wealth is the most relevant wealth for the current analysis.
As it is more liquid than for example housing, the individual is more likely to draw on the
financial assets in times of lower income shocks than to sell the house. Chetty and Szeidl
(2007), for example, argue that real estate will rarely be liquidated during unemployment
spells because of high transaction costs. Basten et al. (2012) further argue that this is even
more likely to be true in Norway due to special transaction taxes.
The dataset further covers a rich set of characteristics for each individual such as age,
education, household size, country of origin, county, and industry of the individual. We
observe these variables from 1985, except for household size and industry which we observe
from 1993 onwards. The industry classification that we use throughout is the 2-digit NACE
code (revision 2) and for education we will divide the individuals into fairly disaggregated
categories. We have the following education groups: less than secondary education; secondary
education; some high school, high school degree; university lower/vocational degree or college
education; university; and research. The income and asset data is deflated using "grunnbeløp
i folketrygden", which is a measure accounting for the inflation used to calculate for example
20In the context of precautionary savings, as pointed out by Carroll and Samwick (1997) it may be preferable
to use the stock of wealth rather than savings. The response to income uncertainty should generally be to
hold more wealth, not necessarily to depress consumption forever. In the case of the buffer stock model, the
household will not save more once the optimal stock of wealth is obtained. However, households with higher
income uncertainty should hold a higher stock of wealth.
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social benefits.
Our initial sample consists of the population of households (as defined above) in Norway.
As we have data over financial assets from 1993, we are only going to use data from that year
in the analysis. However, as described below our rolling window estimation will use data from
8 years back in time for each estimation. Therefore we drop all observations before year 1985.
With this restriction we have 972,465 households in our sample and 14,901,340 observations,
where one observation is household h in year t. Further, we drop individuals younger than 25
and older than 60 (1,393,445 observations) and we remove observations for which information
is missing on county, origin, or education (198,566 observations). As the focus of the paper is
on the correlation of spousal income shocks, we restrict the sample to households where both
individuals have positive labor income (less 1,709,392 observations). Note that labor income
also includes unemployment insurance, maternity leave benefits, etc. We further require
each household to have at least 15 years of positive income observations, which need not be
consecutive (less 3,334,097 observations).21 The couples are allowed to break up and form new
households which will be included if they conform to the other sample restrictions. The final
sample consists of 405,888 households with an average number of periods per household of
21.0 years and a standard deviation of 3.6 years. The total number of observations is 8,265,854
household-years. The financial wealth as well as the income will be expressed in Norwegian
kroner (NOK) throughout the document. At this time one USD equals around 6.6 NOK.
The descriptive statistics for the sample used for the variance and correlation estimations
are shown in Table 3.1.22 The yearly disposable income of the females in the sample is on
average lower than that of the males at 219,000 NOK compared to 351,000 NOK. The total
household disposable income in the sample is on average 570,000 NOK. The average age of
females is around 42.0, the average age of males is around 44.2, and the average household size
is 3.8. The average number of periods (years) per households that we have for the variance
and correlation estimations is 21.0 with a standard deviation of 5.4.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Income female 219364.8 103865.3 1.1 15540156
Income male 350660.7 205418.3 1.1 145096704
Income household 570025.5 243276.5 2.4 145209904
Age female 42.0 8.2 25 60
Age male 44.2 8.2 25 60
Household size 3.8 1.0 2 6
No of years per household 21.0 5.4 15 36
21Using only 10 years does not change the conclusions of the paper, but it adds more noise.
22Note that the descriptive statistics of the sample used in the analysis of precautionary asset holdings will
be presented in Section 4.
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3.3 Co-movements in labor income risk
3.3.1 Estimation of income variance and correlation
In the following we will estimate the income shock correlation and variance for each household.
As mentioned above, we have at least 15 non-zero observations of labor income for each
individual in the household. We use the series of individual disposable incomes in a household
to estimate the total variance and the correlation of household income shocks. In a first
step we attempt to purge the labor income of all factors that may be predictive (to the
econometrician) of the income of the individual. In order to do this we regress the natural
logarithm of individual income on age and age squared, dummies for the education level,
origin, county, and year, as well as the interaction of education with age and age squared and
education and time.
The regression model:
ln yh,i,t =β0 + Xh,i,tβi + countyh,t + τt + h,i,t (3.1)
Xh,i,t includes the observable characteristics of individual i in household h at time t, where
i represents either the female or the male. τt is a year dummy, and h,i,t is the error term.
The model is estimated by OLS and from these regressions we obtain the residuals (ˆh,f,t and
ˆh,m,t).
For the estimation of the variance of total household income we use the residuals from a
regression of the logarithm of total household disposable labor income (the sum of male and
female disposable income) on the individual characteristics of both the male and the female
included in the individual regressions as well as the dummies for county and time.23
ln(yh,f,t + yh,m,t) =β0 + Xh,f,tβf + Xh,m,tβm + countyh,t + τt + h,t (3.2)
It is likely that the variance and correlation vary over, for example, cohort and age.24
We would like to capture this in our estimates of the variance and the correlation, using the
household as a basis for estimation. Therefore, rather than producing one point estimate
of the variance and the correlation, we estimate the variance and the correlation using a
rolling window estimation in order to obtain several estimates for each household. More
specifically, for each household we estimate the variance and correlation in year, t, using the
income information between (t− 8 : t+ 1). In order for the household to have a non-missing
variance and correlation in any given year, t, the household needs a minimum of 5 years where
both spouses have a positive income within the period (t− 8 : t+ 1). Since we observe each
23We are not controlling for household size here as we only have data on this variable since 1993. However,
we are controlling for household size in the asset regressions in the next section and below we are trying to get
a notion of how labor supply may contribute to the correlation patterns.
24Findings by Blundell et al. (2014) indicate that the variance of male income vary over age, time and
education. For the co-movement in income, Shore (2013) shows that it tends to increase over the time in
marriage. In Fagereng et al. (2014) we find that the correlation may vary both over cohorts, age and education.
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household in the dataset for at least 15 years, one household should have at least 6 estimates
for the variance and the correlation if none of the estimates are missing.25
In the sample we use for the regression analysis in the next section we drop observations
before 1993 as this is the year from which we have information on financial wealth of the
households. With this restriction we end up with 373,209 households and 4,923,221 household-
year observations. Table 3.2 displays summary statistics of the estimation results for this
sample. From the bottom row we note that the average number of periods per household is
around 14 years. Female income variance is higher than male income variance at 0.2 compared
to 0.075. Also the standard deviation of female income variance is higher than for the male
income at 0.529 compared to 0.319, although the males have a higher maximum value. The
correlation is very close to zero on average with a standard deviation of 0.429.26 The range of
the estimated correlation is between -0.898 and 0.9. The average variance of total income, at
0.024, is lower than the average male variance which means that the variance of the male and
the female possibly offsets each other to some extent together with the co-movements.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics variance and correlation of income shocks
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Variance female income 0.2 0.529 0 22.263
Variance male income 0.075 0.319 0 32.55
Correlation male and female income 0.001 0.429 -0.898 0.9
Variance household income 0.024 0.07 0 6.47
No of periods per household 14.063 2.891 5 17
N 4,923,221
3.3.2 Correlation and variance over education and industry
If assortative matching on education or industry matters for the co-movement of shocks to
the spousal incomes we would expect that spouses who have the same education or who
work in the same industry would on average have a higher correlation, and perhaps variance,
of these shocks than spouses who do not. To study whether this is the case in our sample
we compare averages of the income variance and correlation of couples who have the same
education level to couples who have different education levels, as well as averages of income
variance and correlation of couples who work in the same industry to couples who work in
different industries. The education and industry groups are represented by the male education
level and industry. As mentioned before, we only observe industry since 1993 and thus, part
of our total sample is not included in the comparison of industries.
25For now we do not attempt to distinguish permanent from temporary shocks to income as it requires more
information. Instead we are focusing on estimating time varying measures of the variance and the correlation
for each household.
26The findings of Shore (2013) also indicate that the average co-movement of income shocks within a
household is around 0.
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We start with education. The first two columns of Table 3.3 show the mean correlation
over male education groups and the two latter columns display the mean variance over the
same groups. Furthermore, column 1 and 3 show averages by education level for couples
who have different education levels and column 2 and 4 show the average estimates for the
households where the spouses have the same education level. Note that subscript h denotes
household h, and subscript m/f refers to the male/female member of the household.
Studying the correlation for households over male education levels we see that the average
correlation is higher for couples with the same education than for couples with different
education and this difference is significant at the 0.1 percent level.27 Furthermore, the
correlation displays a u-shape over the education levels; it is highest for households where
the male has a low and a high level of education and lowest when the male has a high school
degree. If we compare couples with a different education level (column 1) to couples with the
same education level (column 2) we notice that the average correlation is higher for couples
with the same education level in all cases except for high school. However, in the case of
male high-school we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average correlation is the same
for couples with same and different degrees. All other differences are significant at the 0.1
percent level, except for the couples with less than secondary education where the difference
is not significant.
Regarding the total income variance of the household, it more or less follows the u-shaped
pattern of the correlation. We may also note that the average variance for couples with
same education is slightly lower than the average variance for couples with a different degree,
although we cannot reject the hypothesis that they are the same. Moreover, the total variance
is higher in the cases where the couple has the same education for all male education levels
apart from some high school, high school and university/vocational degree. These differences
are all significant. However, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average variance is the
same for the case when male has a research degree. This indicates that even if the couples
with the same education tend to have a higher correlation, the average variance may be lower
because of offsetting variance of the individual labor incomes.
In the next step we will do the same type of analysis over industries, which we expect to be
a stronger determinant of the couple’s correlation and variance of income than the education.
Table 3.4 displays the averages over industry groups. Column 1 and 2 display the correlation
and column 3 and 4 show the variance. In column 1 and 3 we find averages by industries for
couples who work in different industries and in column 2 and 4 we find the average estimates
for couples who work in the same industry. When studying the table it is important to keep
in mind that the variance displayed is not the variance of male income for each industry, but
for the total household income, and thus, the variance estimate also depends on the industry
of the female. Nonetheless, from column 1 we can see that in case the male works in some of
the industries considered risky, such as agriculture and real estate activities, the total income
variance is relatively high. If the male instead works in industries associated to the public
27All the test results reported in this section are not displayed in the paper, but can be obtained by the
authors upon request.
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Table 3.3: Averages of variance and correlation of income shocks over male education levels
Mean(corr(ˆf,t, ˆm,t)) Mean(var(ˆh,t))
educf 6= educm educf = educm educf 6= educm educf = educm
< Secondary 0.0303 0.0470 0.0412 0.0704
Secondary -0.0134 0.0008 0.0248 0.0276
Some High school -0.0044 0.0166 0.0241 0.0220
High school -0.0052 -0.0060 0.0217 0.0209
Uni lower/vocational degree -0.0039 0.0011 0.0239 0.0223
University 0.0101 0.0739 0.0247 0.0357
Research 0.0535 0.1180 0.0294 0.0289
Total -0.0032 0.0073 0.0236 0.0235
Note: Column (1) and (3) refer to households which have different education level, whereas column (2) and
(4) refers to households with the same education level.
sector, such as public administration and defense, as well as education, the total variance
tends to be lower.28
Comparing the average variance of couples who work in different industries to couples
who work in the same industry (column 3 and 4 Table 3.4) we note from the last row of the
table that, on average, the couples working in the same industry have a slightly higher total
variance and the difference is significant at the 5 percent level. Furthermore, for 12 out of the
18 industries for which a comparison is possible, couples who work in the same industry have a
higher variance on average, and the difference is significant at least at the 5 percent level. The
exception is electricity and gas and transportation and storage in which cases we cannot reject
that the average variance is the same between the groups. In the cases where the couples
working in the same industry have a lower variance (mining and quarrying, information and
communication, public administration and defense, education and human health and social
work), all differences are significant at the 0.1 percent level. It is interesting to note that half
of these are industries associated to the public sector where we would expect a low variance.
When it comes to the correlation of couples working in the same industry, we see from
column 2 that the highest correlation can be found in accommodation and food service
activities (0.07), followed by agriculture, forestry and fishing (0.06). The lowest correlation
for couples working in the same industry can be found in mining and quarrying (-0.04) and
in electricity and gas (-0.02). Comparing column 1 to column 2 we see that, as expected,
the average income correlation of couples working in the same industry is higher than the
average income correlation of couples working in different industries for all industry groups.
All differences are significant at the 0.1 percent level. The only industry where a comparison is
not possible is for ’water, sewerage and waste management’ where we, due to few observations,
did not obtain an estimate for couples working in the same industry.
28Although not shown for this exact sample, we know from Fagereng et al. (2014) that the probability of the
female working in the same industry, conditional on the male working there tend to be quite high for these
industries. Therefore, the averages of total income displayed in the table can be expected to be low due to low
variances in individual incomes.
3.4. INCOME RISK AND THE ADDED WORKER EFFECT 81
Table 3.4: Averages of variance and correlation of income shocks over male industry
Mean(corr(ˆft, ˆmt)) Mean(var(ˆht))
indf 6= indm indf = indm indf 6= indm indf = indm
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0.0323 0.0599 0.0390 0.0433
Mining and quarrying -0.0447 -0.0414 0.0201 0.0200
Manufacturing -0.0192 -0.0044 0.0195 0.0201
Electricity and gas -0.0289 -0.0211 0.0128 0.0136
Water supply, sewerage and waste management -0.0069 - 0.0197 -
Construction -0.0069 0.0020 0.0240 0.0250
Wholesale and retail trade -0.0174 0.0059 0.0228 0.0253
Transportation and storage -0.0124 -0.0062 0.0243 0.0250
Accomodation and food service activities 0.0119 0.0744 0.0347 0.0453
Information and communication -0.0169 -0.0134 0.0173 0.0169
Financial and insurance activities -0.0189 -0.0141 0.0160 0.0160
Real estate activities -0.0076 0.0027 0.0330 0.0355
Professional, scientific and technical activities -0.0050 0.0032 0.0237 0.0239
Administrative and support service activities -0.0150 0.0007 0.0309 0.0333
Public administration and defense 0.0062 0.0229 0.0186 0.0182
Education 0.0088 0.0375 0.0223 0.0199
Human health and social work 0.0067 0.0350 0.0293 0.0286
Arts, entertainment and recreation -0.0040 0.0121 0.0265 0.0275
Other service activities -0.0147 0.0127 0.0261 0.0298
Total -0.0109 0.0073 0.0227 0.0235
Note: Column (1) and (3) refer to households which have different industry classifications, whereas column (2) and
(4) refers to households with the same industry classification.
From this descriptive analysis we conclude that working in the same industry and, to
some extent, having the same education are important for the income risk that a household
faces and could be determinants of the household’s ability to use spousal labor supply as an
insurance against income shocks.
In the next section we will use our measure of the household’s ability to use labor supply
to insure income to test whether households consider this insurance mechanism important.
3.4 Income risk and the added worker effect
3.4.1 Prediction
In the following section we provide intuition for how the ability of an individual to insure the
income of her or his spouse depends on the correlation of shocks to the individuals’ incomes.
Based on this reasoning we will have a prediction that we will test empirically in the following
subsection.
We focus on insurance through spousal labor supply adjustments, which we refer to as the
added worker effect. To illustrate how co-movements of spousal income risk matters for this
type of insurance, imagine a household with a male and a female who both work, act as a
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unit and pool income within the household.29 They both earn an hourly wage in the labor
market and the wages of both individuals are subject to shocks. The shocks may be more or
less correlated among the individuals depending on, for example, whether they work in the
same industry or not.
In order to study the importance of co-movements of wage shocks for the added-worker-
effect we will look closer at two cases: a) The labor supply is inelastic, i.e. the spouses cannot
use spousal labor supply as insurance; b) Labor supply is elastic and the household can insure
income through labor supply.
a. Inelastic labor supply. In this case changes in the co-movement of shocks simply affect
the variability of household income. If, at the extreme, the spouses have identical income
processes and a correlation of income shocks of -1, income pooling will eliminate all income
risk. However, if the correlation is 1, there is no insurance through income pooling. Thus
we expect that with inelastic labor supply, the co-movement of shocks to income only affects
spousal insurance through the effect on total income variability.
b. Elastic labor supply. In this case the co-movement of wage shocks does not only affect
total income variability, but also the effectiveness of the insurance through spousal labor
supply. To see this, imagine that the wage of the husband has been hit by a negative shock. If
the labor market situation of the wife is also negatively affected it is likely to be more difficult
for her to cover part of the income loss using her labor supply, than if she was not affected
by the shock. Thus, we expect that with elastic labor supply, the co-movement of shocks to
spousal wages does not only affect the spousal insurance through the effect on total income
variability, but also the ability to insure income through spousal labor supply.
As such, given all other insurance channels, case a and case b have different implications
for the precautionary savings of a household. More specifically, in case a, we would expect a
household with a higher correlation to save more than a household with a low correlation of
shocks, all else equal. However, given the variance of total income, the correlation of wage
shocks should not matter for precautionary savings.
The situation is different when labor supply is elastic, as in case b. First of all, we would
expect precautionary savings to be lower in this case than in case a, but most importantly,
we would expect savings to vary with the correlation of wage shocks when we control for the
variance of the wage shocks. Households with a higher correlation of shocks have a lower
ability to insure income through labor supply and are expected to save more than households
with a low correlation of shocks, all else equal.
Therefore, with appropriate data we are able to test whether spousal labor supply is an
important insurance mechanism for the household.30
29If the individuals in the household act as two separate units with no income pooling, the correlation of
labor income shocks is irrelevant for savings. Note that the analysis only hinges on the spouses sharing a
strictly positive fraction of their income.
30However, if the correlation is found not to have any effect independent of the total variance, we do not
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3.4.2 Empirical analysis
In this subsection we test the prediction stated above: If households use spousal labor supply
to insure labor income, the correlation of income risk should affect precautionary savings
independently of the variance in income shocks.
In order to test the prediction, we estimate regression models with accumulated financial
wealth as the dependent variable and with variance and correlation of income shocks as
independent variables, controlling for other household characteristics that are likely to be
important for the asset holdings. If the coefficient on income correlation is positive and
significantly different from zero it is evidence in favor of spousal labor supply being used to
insure income.
In our analysis we use four different measures of financial wealth: the logarithm of total
financial assets; total financial assets normalized by income; the logarithm of safe financial
assets; and safe financial assets normalized by income. The safe asset category excludes direct
and indirect stock holdings and thus it consists of bank deposits and bond holdings. To the
extent that safe assets are more liquid than risky assets we may see a difference in the effect
of income risk only including these assets.
As mentioned before, we observe financial assets of households from 1993. Given the
procedure to estimate the variance and the correlation of income risk of the households using
a 10 period rolling window from t− 8 to t+ 1, we will with our sample from 1985 have the first
variance and correlation estimates for year 1993. Since we will not use observations before
1993 in the regressions we drop these observations and are left with 373,209 households and
4,923,221 observations in total.
The descriptive statistics of the sample we use for the regressions are presented in Table
3.5. The average (disposable) household income in the sample is around 600,000 NOK. The
average financial wealth per household in the sample is around 456,000 NOK. The ratio of
financial wealth to disposable income is on average 0.75, but we see that maximum value is 35,
indicating that most individuals in the sample has a low financial wealth to income, but that
there are exceptions. The average of safe assets is around 214,000 NOK. As the minimum
value of this variable is 0 we can conclude that the entire financial wealth of at least one of
the households consists of stocks. The average household observation has a higher yearly
income than safe asset holdings as the average is around 0.51. The average age of males is
around 46 years old and of females around 44. The average household size in our sample is 3.7
individuals. We also see from the table that in 36 percent of the households the individuals
have the same education category and in 18 percent of the households the individuals have
the same industry classification (2-digit NACE, rev. 2).
We estimate the following regression model:
lnWh,t = α0 + α1 lnV arh,t + α2Corrh,t + α3Xh,t + θt + ηh + νh,t (3.3)
where Wh,t is one of the four measures of financial wealth, lnV arh,t is the logarithm of our
measure of the variance of income shocks and Corrh,t is the measure of the correlation of
know whether this is because labor supply is inelastic of because spouses are not pooling their income.
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Table 3.5: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Household income 600265.0 162468.4 224003.1 1330590
Financial wealth 456416.5 848761.1 236.8 8339515
Ratio of financial wealth to disp. income 0.754 1.421 0.001 35.23
Safe assets 214243.7 395410.3 0 8010357
Ratio safe assets to disp. income 0.506 0.901 0 30.024
Age, male 46.4 7.4 28 60
Age, female 44.3 7.5 28 60
Household size 3.7 1.1 2 6
Share in same education 0.357 0.479 0 1
Share in same industry 0.184 0.387 0 1
Variance income 0.024 0.07 0 6.47
Variance female income 0.2 0.529 0 22.263
Variance male income 0.075 0.319 0 32.55
Correlation income 0.001 0.429 -0.898 0.9
N 4923221
income shocks. Xh is a vector of household characteristics including the logarithm of the total
household disposable income, male age and age squared, dummies for household size, and for
the industry and education of both spouses, as well as year dummies. Moreover, households
may differ in some unobserved variable, which might also be correlated with the outcome
variable. This variable is denoted by ηh and we assume that ηh is time invariant.
In a first step we estimate this model using the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator.
However, the OLS estimator is likely to be problematic for this analysis for at least two
reasons. First of all, as we are using at most 10 observations for each estimate of a household’s
variance and correlation of income, the household variance and correlation are likely not to
be precisely estimated. Thus, most probably we have a problem of measurement error in
the variables of interest. Assuming that the measurement error is classical, the estimated
coefficients are downward biased. In an attempt to correct for this we follow the approach in,
for example, Carroll and Samwick (1997) and use the instrumental variables (IV) estimator.31
As instruments we will use the variation in couple combinations of industry over time. For
example, all males that work in education with a spouse working in construction, according to
the 2-digit NACE classification will be one combination, etc. More specifically, the instruments
are the average income shock correlation and variance for each such industry combination
at each point in time. We consider this to be an appropriate instrument as the industry
combination of a couple is likely to be an important determinant of the income risk and, in
31However, we go about it slightly different with respect to their study. In their analysis, Carroll and Samwick
(1997) use industry, education, and occupation for the male as well as age interactions of these variables as
instruments.
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addition, the influence of such a combination may change over time. The exclusion restriction
is that the industry variances and correlations estimated for each spousal industry combination
do not influence the financial wealth of the household other than through the household
income variance and correlation. We consider this to be a plausible assumption as it is
difficult to imagine how the couple combination of industry would influence the financial
wealth beyond the effect on income variance and correlation once we control for the industries
of the individuals.
Another potential problem with the OLS estimator is that households with a high income
shock correlation or variance could be systematically different from households that have a
low income correlation or variance in ways that we are not able to control for and that may
be relevant for precautionary savings. That is, we have an omitted variables problem. As
mentioned above, one example would be risk aversion. Households with a lower risk aversion
may choose to work in more risky industries (as well as the same industry), and they may
save less.32 In order to deal with the problem of unobserved heterogeneity we assume that
this unobserved household-specific factor is fixed over time and we account for it using the
fixed effects (FE) estimator.
Finally, in order to try to correct both endogeneity problems at the same time, we use a
fourth estimator, the IV-FE estimator, which is our preferred estimator.
First stage. Before we go to the main results we show the results from the first stages.
Due to the measurement error problem in our variables of interest we have two endogenous
regressors in the asset regressions. In the first stages of the IV and the IV-FE estimations we
predict each of these regressors using both our instruments. As stated above, the instruments
we use are the average variance and correlation of income shocks over male and female
industry combinations and year, denoted by V arIndct and CorrIndct, where c denotes
industry combinations (i.e. male works in education and the female in construction, etc.).
Thus, the first stage equations are:
lnV arh,t = γ0 + γ1 lnV arIndc,t + γ2CorrIndc,t + γ3Xh,t + λh + ωh,t (3.4)
Corrh,t = δ0 + δ1 lnV arIndc,t + δ2CorrIndc,t + δ3Xh,t + κh +$h,t (3.5)
The results from the first stages are displayed in Table 3.6. In column 1 and 2 we show the
results from the first stage of the IV. We can see that our instrument for correlation is a strong
predictor of the couple correlation and, similarly, from column 2 we note that the instrument
for variance is a strong predictor for the variance in income shocks of the couples. Even
though our instrument for variance seems to be a weak predictor of the household correlation
and vice versa, we may note from the table that the F-values are very large, indicating that
the instruments are strong. In column 3 and 4 we show the results from the first stage within
32Shore (2013) finds that couples seem to display positive assortative matching on income risk, in the sense
that a husband with a higher income volatility is more likely to have a wife with higher income volatility. It is
not too farfetched to believe that this could be matching on risk aversion.
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regression.33 We can see that the results are similar to those in column 1 and 2, although the
effect of the instruments is somewhat lower. The F-values of the instruments are still very
high. Thus, these first stage results seem to indicate that our instruments are strong and we
Table 3.6: First Stage IV and IV-FE
First stage IV First stage IV-FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corrh,t lnV arh,t Corrh,t lnV arh,t
V arIndc,t 0.001 0.693∗∗∗ -0.002 0.380∗∗∗
(0.00167) (0.00518) (0.00168) (0.00430)
CorrIndc,t 0.999∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗ 0.613∗∗∗ -0.015
(0.00830) (0.02579) (0.00914) (0.02322)
Log disposable income yes yes yes yes
Age polynomial yes yes yes yes
Education dummies yes yes no no
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
Household size yes yes yes yes
F-value (instruments) 9374 11704 2598 4578
N 4923221 4923221 4923221 4923221
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
will proceed to the main analysis of the paper
The effect of variance and correlation on precautionary wealth holdings. In the
following we test whether spousal labor supply (or the added worker effect) is an important
labor income insurance mechanism for households in Norway. As stated above, we will use four
different outcome variables: log financial wealth, the ratio of financial wealth to disposable
income, the log of safe financial assets, and the ratio of safe financial assets to disposable
income. Before the regressions we winsorize the financial asset categories at the 99 percentile.
This is also why the number of observations are differing slightly between the regressions of
different asset categories.
The first table, Table 3.7, shows the results using log financial wealth of the household
as the dependent variable. The first column displays the results of the OLS estimator from
a regression of financial wealth on the logarithm of income variance and correlation. The
coefficient on income variance is positive and significant, as we would expect from earlier
studies. The correlation is also positive and significant, but it has a very small impact. In
column 2 we see the results from the second stage of the IV regression. The impact of variance
33Note that the education dummies drop out in the within estimation as education is fixed over time.
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is now stronger. The coefficient on correlation is much stronger with this specification and
indicates that the added worker effect is important for Norwegian households. However, we
would still be worried about potential omitted variables bias. In column 3 we attempt to
deal with this problem using the fixed effects estimator. We see that both the coefficient on
the variance and the correlation becomes smaller with respect to both the IV and the OLS
estimator, indicating that there might be an unobserved, household-specific variable that
is positively correlated with income risk and precautionary savings. When we attempt to
deal with both unobservable variables and measurement error using our preferred estimator,
the IV-FE estimator, we see that both the variance and the correlation of couples’ income
shocks have an important impact on precautionary financial wealth of the household. A one
percent change in the variance leads to 0.31 percent increase in financial wealth and one unit
change in the correlation increases the financial wealth by about 42 percent34. In regards
to the correlation impact, moving from the lowest (=-0.9) to the highest correlation (=0.9)
in our sample is predicted to give a median increase in financial assets of 97,144 NOK, or
equivalently 16 percent of yearly disposable income.35 Increasing the total variance with one
standard deviation, as reported in table 3.2, is predicted to give a median change in financial
wealth of 146,491 NOK, corresponding to about 24 percent of yearly disposable income. Note
however that the standard deviation of the total variance is about three times larger than the
average value.
Table 3.8 shows the results using financial wealth normalized by income as dependent
variable. The results show a similar pattern to that of financial wealth. The variance is
positive and significant for all specifications with a stronger impact in the IV specifications.
The results in column 4 indicate that a one percent increase in income variance increases
the precautionary savings, measured by the ratio of financial wealth to income, by around
0.36. Regarding the correlation, it is now negative with a small effect when estimated by OLS,
but as before the impact is much stronger, and positive, with the IV estimator. In the fixed
effects estimation, correlation is again estimated to have a stronger negative impact relative
to the OLS estimator. With our preferred estimator, however, we see that the correlation
has a strong, positive impact, independent of the variance, on precautionary wealth holdings
measured by the share of financial wealth to income. A unit change in the correlation results
in an increase of 0.15 in the ratio of financial wealth to income.
In Table 3.9 we use the logarithm of safe financial assets as the dependent variable and
from column 1 we see that the pattern is similar also for this wealth measure. We observe
small effects from the OLS regression, and a more negative impact when controlling for a time
invariant unobservable variable in column 3. In the IV estimation the effects are stronger
and using our preferred estimator we obtain strong, positive effects for both variance and
correlation, although we see that the effect is smaller than for total financial assets. A one
percent increase in the variance of income shocks result in a 0.24 percent increase in safe asset
3442 = 100 ∗ (exp0.351 − 1)
35The correlation impact is found by predicting the financial wealth for all households, using the IV-FE
estimates, assuming the all households have the highest and the lowest correlation. Then, we compute the
median change in financial wealth between the two predicted values.
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Table 3.7: Regressions with log of financial wealth as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV FE IV and FE
lnV arh,t 0.120∗∗∗ 0.566∗∗∗ 0.0575∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗
(0.000534) (0.0101) (0.000508) (0.0115)
Corrh,t 0.00621∗∗∗ 1.613∗∗∗ -0.0391∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.00165) (0.0353) (0.00127) (0.0396)
ln Incomeh,t 1.077∗∗∗ 1.766∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗∗
(0.00308) (0.0133) (0.00297) (0.0119)
Age 2nd polynomial, male yes yes yes yes
Household size yes yes yes yes
Education dummies (f,m) yes yes no no
Industry dummies (f,m) yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
N 4923221 4923221 4923221 4921922
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Table 3.8: Regressions with ratio of financial wealth to income as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV FE IV and FE
lnV arh,t 0.109∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.0430∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗
(0.000386) (0.00809) (0.000346) (0.00871)
Corrh,t -0.0227∗∗∗ 1.381∗∗∗ -0.0311∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗
(0.00107) (0.0272) (0.000863) (0.0294)
ln Incomeh,t 0.0659∗∗∗ 0.704∗∗∗ -0.509∗∗∗ -0.173∗∗∗
(0.00248) (0.0106) (0.00204) (0.00901)
Age 2nd polynomial, male yes yes yes yes
Household size yes yes yes yes
Education dummies (f,m) yes yes no no
Industry dummies (f,m) yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
N 4824755 4824755 4824755 4822979
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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holdings and a unit change in the correlation results in an increase of around 21 percent in
safe asset holdings.
Table 3.9: Regressions with log of safe assets as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV FE IV and FE
lnV arh,t 0.0781∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 0.0617∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.000574) (0.00941) (0.000608) (0.0133)
Corrh,t 0.0325∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ -0.0421∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(0.00173) (0.0327) (0.00152) (0.0463)
ln Incomeh,t 0.772∗∗∗ 1.166∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.538∗∗∗
(0.00340) (0.0124) (0.00356) (0.0137)
Age 2nd polynomial, male yes yes yes yes
Household size yes yes yes yes
Education dummies (f,m) yes yes no no
Industry dummies (f,m) yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
N 4923221 4923221 4923221 4921922
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Finally, in Table 3.10 we show the results from a regression using safe assets normalized
by household disposable income. The same patterns as for the former regressions using the
other outcome variables show up here, but with a lower magnitude of the coefficients. From
column four we note that a one percent increase in the variance of income shocks leads to an
increase of the ratio of safe assets to income of 0.15. The impact of the correlation is also
much lower, but still positive and significant. A one unit increase in the correlation leads to a
0.07 increase in the same ratio.
From the analysis presented above we conclude that a higher variance in shocks to
household income increases the precautionary asset holdings of a household. Importantly for
our study, we find that the correlation of income shocks within the household has a positive
impact on precautionary savings, controlling for the variance in income shocks. This indicates
that spousal labor supply is an important labor income insurance channel of the households
in Norway.
Additional checks. In order to make sure that the results are robust to slightly different
specifications of the model we have made some additional estimations.
In the current regressions we have included the correlation of individual income risk. The
correlation requires more information to estimate than the covariance and we might be worried
that the measurement error problem is larger for the correlation. This should effectively be
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Table 3.10: Regressions with ratio of safe assets to income as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV FE IV and FE
lnV arh,t 0.0496∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.000235) (0.00404) (0.000238) (0.00549)
Corrh,t -0.00142∗ 0.475∗∗∗ -0.0206∗∗∗ 0.0686∗∗∗
(0.000673) (0.0137) (0.000593) (0.0186)
ln Incomeh,t -0.110∗∗∗ 0.0927∗∗∗ -0.353∗∗∗ -0.222∗∗∗
(0.00149) (0.00525) (0.00141) (0.00560)
Age 2nd polynomial, male yes yes yes yes
Household size yes yes yes yes
Education dummies (f,m) yes yes no no
Industry dummies (f,m) yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes
N 4824755 4824755 4824755 4823128
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
taken care of by the instruments, but in order to show that our main conclusion does not
change using the covariance we display the results of the IV-FE estimator using the logarithm
of total financial wealth as the outcome variable. The results are displayed in column 1 of
Table 3.11 and we can see that both variance and covariance are positive and significant,
confirming the main conclusion from above.
Another concern may be that the households who hold very little safe assets are different
in ways that could influence the regression results. To make sure that this is not the case, we
check the results of the IV-FE estimator using the logarithm of total financial wealth as the
outcome variable, restricting the estimation to households with at least 3000 NOK in safe
assets. The result is shown in column 2 of Table 3.11. As we can see the results are very
similar to what is found above.36
The conclusion from this analysis is that the correlation of income shocks within a
household has an independent, positive impact on precautionary asset holdings of the household,
controlling for income variance. As our theoretical prediction seems to hold in the data we
further conclude that spousal labor supply is important for the income insurance of a household.
36Importantly, Hurst et al. (2006) note that including business owners in the analysis increases the importance
of the precautionary savings motive. The reason is that business owners tend to have a higher income variance
and hold higher wealth. We have also run the regressions without self-employed individuals and it does not
change the results.
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Table 3.11: Additional checks
(1) (2)
Safe assets > 3000 Covariance
lnV arh,t 0.322∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.0109) (0.00966)
Corrh,t 0.339∗∗∗
(0.0371)
Covh,t 3.415∗∗∗
(0.374)
ln Incomeh,t 0.645∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗
(0.0111) (0.0108)
Age 2nd polynomial, male yes yes
Household size yes yes
Education dummies (f,m) no no
Industry dummies (f,m) yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
N 4799996 4921922
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the importance of intra-household risk-sharing through labor
supply, or the so called added worker effect. More specifically, we test the theoretical prediction
that, in case households are using labor supply to smooth income shocks, the correlation
of these shocks should have a positive and significant effect on savings, controlling for the
variance of shocks to total household income.
In order to test this prediction we use administrative data from Norway. In a first step we
estimate the variance and correlation of income shocks for each household. We find that the
correlation of income shocks in the population is very close to zero on average, but that there
is some important variation. In particular, couples who work in the same industry have a
higher correlation of shocks than those who do not, which we would expect if the estimated
correlation could tell us something about the common risk that these couples face.
Importantly, in the main analysis we find that the variation in correlation across households
is not trivial from the perspective of income insurance. The results from our regression analysis
show that the correlation has an impact on precautionary asset holdings, independent of the
variance of income shocks. In the case where all households move from the lowest to the
highest correlation documented in our sample, the predicted median change in asset holdings
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is 97,144 NOK per, which corresponds to 16 percent of yearly disposable income. This suggests
that spousal labor supply, or the added worker effect, is indeed important for income insurance
and thus that the co-movement of income risk is important for the household’s ability to insure
income. This may have important implications for the design of tax and benefit systems, such
as the unemployment insurance. Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that our findings
relate to Norway, a country with a relatively rigid labor market and a generous welfare system.
We therefore expect that our results provide a lower bound on the importance of insurance
through spousal labor supply and we would expect the importance to be even greater in
countries with more flexible labor markets and less generous welfare systems, as for example
the US.
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